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The United States of America and the 
Law of Piracy 
The Basic Framework 
"T'1 he United States of America was governed by basic conceptions of 
~ English law during the days of the formation of the Union, and the 
leading drafters of the Articles of Confederation in 1777 and the Constitution 
in 1787 were lawyers trained in English law. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, each of the thirteen newly 
independent states retained "every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is 
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States."l State 
laws with regard to "treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor" were 
preserved and extradition obligations accepted; there was no equivalent 
extradition obligation among the states of the confederation with regard to 
ordinary crimes.2 This language seems to rest on an archaic definition of 
"felony" and an evolving conception of the impact of the Statute of Treasons 
of 1352 as it might apply to states not ruled by a king.3 "Piracy" was not 
included. Instead, "piracy" was treated as both a kind of public war and 
special sort of common crime. While the states were forbidden to maintain 
vessels of war in time of peace except as authorized by the representatives of 
at least nine of the thirteen states in a formal meeting of the "Congress,"4 or 
issue any "letters of marque or [sic; and?] reprisal" in the absence of a 
declaration of war by the Congress,S an exception was made for the case 
when any particular state should "be infested by pirates, in which case vessels 
of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall 
continue, or until the United states in Congress assembled, shall determine 
otherwise."6 The courts to deal with cases of alleged piracy, however, were 
not to be courts of the states. The power was expressly given to the Congress 
of all the states for: 
Establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, 
and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United 
States [but not state militias or warships] shall be divided or appropriated-of granting 
letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace-appointing courts for the trial of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving 
and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures ... .7 
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To the degree the provision authorizing states to commission their vessels 
of war to defend them from infestations of "pirates" might be construed as a 
derogation from the power of the Congress alone to determine on peace and 
war, the power of the states was preserved,s but that derogation does not 
seem to have been intended to affect the jurisdiction of maritime and prize 
courts established by the Congress or authorize the states to establish 
competing courts.9 On the other hand, treating "piracy" as if a branch of 
maritime warfare cannot have been intended to affect the residual powers of 
the states to denominate as "piracy" whatever they chose within their 
territorial jurisdiction, and establish courts to try alleged offenders under 
state law. The congressional courts were authorized only to try "piracies and 
felonies committed on the high seas," apparently intended to refer to areas 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any particular state. There is no closer 
definition of "piracy" in the Articles of Confederation and no known 
significant practice. 
The confusion between "piracy" as a sort of unlicensed belligerency and 
"piracy" as a municipal law crime equivalent to robbery seems to have been 
maintained, with both definitions existing side by side, and naval suppression 
existing side by side with municipal tribunals. The distinctions were 
presumably worked out in practice depending on where any particular 
accused "pirate" was taken and by whom, and under what license the taker 
operated. 
James Madison's Reports on the Debates in the Federal Convention of 178710 
records the discussion preceding the adoption of the Constitution. According 
to that source, a "Committee of Detail " chaired by "Mr. Rutlidge" (SiC)l1 on 
6 August 1787 presented a working draft with the following provision: 
[Art.] VII Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the power ... To 
declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and 
the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offenses against 
the law of nations .... 12 
This clause is quite separate from the proposed clause authorizing the 
legislature to "make war," but appears immediately after a clause authorizing 
the legislature "To make rules concerning captures on land and water." The 
authority of the Supreme Court in the Rutledge Committee's draft was to 
extend "to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United 
States" and also "to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," among 
other things; the legislature was to be empowered to assign any part of this 
jurisdiction to such inferior courts as it might establish.13 
The "piracy" clause was brought before the Convention on 17 August. 
Madison moved to strike the words "and punishment" after "declare the 
law." Two delegates expressed concern only over the effect of the deletion 
on counterfeiting (apparently construing the suggestion to strike the phrase in 
both places where it appears in the clause). One of them pointed out that 
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without the phrase there might be no legal authority to punish counterfeiters 
of foreign currency. Since the only reference in the provision to counter-
feiting is restricted to "the coin of the United States," it seems that delegates 
to the Convention and Madison in his notes were considering counterfeiting 
foreign currency as an offense "against the law of nations." It is clear that 
territorial limits on jurisdiction were a concern; that a foreign power would 
have no jurisdiction to apply its law in the new federation, and if the federal 
government did not have the express power to punish the counterfeiters of 
foreign paper or coin some states of the union might become havens for 
counterfeiters. The argument that seems to have carried the day merely 
pointed out that in writing a constitution it was not necessary to be as 
meticulous as in drafting a statute. Madison's motion was carried 7-3 with 
three states abstaining. 
Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania then moved to strike out "declare the 
law" and insert "punish" before the word "piracies." That motion also 
carried 7-3. Madison and Edmund Randolph14 then moved to reinsert the 
word "define" before "punish" arguing that the definition of "felony at 
common law is vague" and in places "defective." There is no hint that 
anybody conceived of "piracy" as a crime at international law, but only as a 
felony at English Common Law. There was no doubt entertained by anybody 
that the Congress of the United States could exercise a legal power to define 
not only "piracy," but apparently to define "offences against the law of 
nations." The Madison and Randolph amendment passed unanimously.15 
It is difficult to understand either the reference to "common law" or the 
assumption that the United States, a single entity in the world, had the legal 
power to define and punish offenses against the "law of nations" if those two 
phrases are taken in any other context than that of Blackstone. If the "law of 
nations" meant merely the national law of all states, there could be no 
problem; but if it were intended to mean the law determined by treaty, 
diplomatic correspondence and the practice of states in the international 
order there are obvious technical legal difficulties in the language as adopted 
on 17 August. The problem with the phrase "common law" is easier once it is 
recalled that since 1536 in England "Common Law" procedures were used in 
the trials of piracies and "felonies" within the jurisdiction of the Admiral. 
The English constitutional struggle focusing on the traditions and political 
subordination of the various courts in England at the time of Lord Coke and 
the Stuart Kings, thus the technical distinctions between "Common Law" 
and "Civil Law" as the law applied in Admiralty courts, had lost meaning. By 
time of Blackstone, the phrase "Common Law" had acquired a normal 
meaning referring to nonstatutory law applied throughout England, but not 
necessarily the law applied only by specific courts. 
The more important question, that of bringing the power of the Congress 
to make law into harmony with the international legal order was raised again 
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on 14 September 1787 by Govemeur Morris moving to strike out "punish" 
before the words "offences against the law of nations" so as to have the words 
he had proposed successfully a month before simply carry their meaning on 
through the entire clause. But James Wilson, also of Pennsylvania, 16 objected on 
the ground that "To pretend to define [emphasis sic] the law of nations which 
depended on the authority of all the civilized nations of the world, would have a 
look of arrogance, that would make us ridiculous. "17 Morris replied that the 
word "define" "is proper when applied to offences [emphasis sic]; the law of 
nations being often too vague and deficient to be a rule. " The motion by Morris 
passed very narrowly, 6-5, with Pennsylvania opposed: The word "punish" was 
retained as applied to "Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas," but 
was deleted from the text as applied to "Offences against the Law of Nations. "18 
The clause as adopted, and now contained in the Constitution is as follows: 
The Congress shall have the Power ... To defme and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.19 
The authority of the Congress to provide for the punishment of counter-
feiting appears elsewhere, and applies only to counterfeiting the securities and 
current coin of the United States; there appears to be no authority in the 
Congress to make laws against counterfeiting foreign currency unless that is 
considered an offense against the law of nations or part of the power of the 
Congress elsewhere in the Constitution.20 
The power of the Congress to declare war, grant letters of marque and 
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water appears in the 
clause of the Constitution immediately following the clause relating to piracy 
and offenses against the law of nations. There was no reference to piracy in the 
discussion of that provision as recorded by Madison. 
All cases of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" are reserved to the federal 
courts,21 and treason is defmed as "only in levying War against [the United 
States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.''22 
Further refmement of all these sweeping words was left to the Congress and the 
courts. 
Piracy as such was not discussed when the Convention passed unanimously 
the provision that "all Treaties made under the authority of the United States 
shall be the supreme law of the several states and of their citizens and 
inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their 
decisions."23 The minor alterations that resulted in this language being 
condensed to the form in which it appears in the Constitution were apparently 
the work of the "Committee of Stile [sic; style] and Arrangement," which had 
reported its proposed text on 12 September 1787.24 There is no known record of 
the deliberations of that Committee. The fmallanguage says: " ... all treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby .... ''25 
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From this brief summary, it is possible to conclude that the framers of the 
American Constitution, insofar as they focused on the question at all, 
conceived "piracy" to be something different from "offenses against the law 
of nations," but rather falling into a like category with "felonies committed 
on the high seas." Precisely what was left of the category "offenses against 
the law of nations" seems very unclear; indeed, it appears to have been 
considered unclear by most of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention. 
To those who accepted the Blackstone conception of "piracy" being an 
offense against the law of nations, but the "law of nations" being merely a 
collective term for national laws that were similar in all civilized nations, like 
the law merchant, there would have been no problem of analysis or 
interpretation. To those like James Wilson whose conception of the "law of 
nations" involved obligations owed by states in the international legal order 
to their sister states, the power of the Congress to define any of its terms must 
have seemed inconsistent with the power of the Executive to negotiate with 
foreign governments and to send and receive diplomatic missions, since 
diplomatic correspondence was necessarily conceived as part of the law-
making process of that "law of nations." Wilson's analysis was rejected 6-5 in 
the one instance in which the problem was discussed as far as surviving 
records indicate. The law-making process of the law between states (to revert 
to Zouche's term) was apparently conceived by the framers of the 
Constitution to be confined to treaty, and there was no discussion of the 
development of the law relating to "piracy" (or any "offenses against the law 
of nations") in the discussion of the treaty-making power or the binding force 
within the Union of treaties made under the Constitution. 
This analysis is more or less borne out by Federalist No. 42 (written by 
James Madison) which addresses the powers of the federal government 
relating to intercourse with foreign nations. The question addressed in the 
Federalist is, Why should these particular powers be given to a central 
authority and not reserved to the states? The answer with regard to the 
powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, said Madison, 
was self-evident; they "speak their own propriety," and merely repeat 
powers already conceded to a central authority in the Articles of 
Confederation.26 As to the power to define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, Madison argued that "the provision of the federal 
articles [i.e., the Articles of Confederation] on the subject of piracies and 
felonies, extends no farther than to the establishment of courts for the trial of 
these offences. "27 And, he went on, "The definition of piracies might perhaps 
without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative 
definition of them, is found in most municipal codes."28 By distinguishing 
between the "law of nations" and "most municipal codes" Madison seems to 
have denied the relationship between the two sources of substantive law 
considered inherently linked by Blackstone and a narrow majority of the 
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Convention. But Madison went no further, and it appears that he did not 
regard the issue as sufficiently pressing in 1788 to be an obstacle to the states 
adopting the new Constitution. He seems to have regarded "piracy" as a 
"crime" in fact defined by the "law between states." But he has left us no 
other clue as to how he believed that law was evidenced and what its 
jurisdictional terms and substantive provisions might have been. 
This glib reference to "piracy," reminiscent of the remark by Justice 
Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court nearly two hundred years 
later regarding pornography, that he could not define it, but he knew it when 
he saw it, can be contrasted with the somewhat more elaborate treatment 
Madison gave "felonies on the high seas," a definition of which he felt was 
"evidently requisite:" 
Felony is a term ofloose signification even in the common law of England; and of various 
import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common, nor the statute law 
of that or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless 
previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term as defined in 
the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a 
dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States; 
and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and 
uniformity therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case, was in every respect 
necessary and proper [for the central govemment].29 
As to "offenses against the law of nations," Madison seems to have 
conceived them as not applicable to individuals at all, but possible sources of 
public conflict if a single state could determine for itself the propriety of its 
public acts that impinge on the sovereignty of a foreign power: 
These articles [of Confederation] contain no provision for the case of offences against 
the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to 
embroil the confederacy with foreign nations.30 
There is no other word in the Federalist addressed to that provision of the 
Constitution, or any explanation of why it should be within the power of the 
Congress, rather than the Executive and perhaps the Senate through 
diplomatic negotiation and treaty, to define "offenses against the law of 
nations" as so conceived. 
The difficulties of defining "piracy" became apparent when the first 
Congress attempted to implement these provisions by statute. The problems 
of jurisdiction and cri.minallaw enforcement's needs for some degree of 
specificity in setting out the precise limits that a person could transgress only 
at risk of punishment by public authorities of a government with limited 
powers, could no longer be assumed away or covered over with Blackstonian 
or Madisonian generalities.31 
"Piracy" as a Municipal Law Crime in the United States 
The Court System. The Judiciary Act of24 September 1789,32 section 9, gave to 
each of the thirteen original federal "District Courts" exclusively of the 
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courts of the several states, cognizance of all "crimes and offences that shall 
be cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within 
their respective districts, or upon the high seas" where the punishments did 
not exceed 30 stripes with a whip, a fine of $100, or imprisonment of six 
months. In addition to this rather minor criminal jurisdiction, the District 
Courts had civil jurisdiction in "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction" (but not superseding state Common Law jurisdiction in any 
cases of overlap), and concurrent jurisdiction with state courts and federal 
Circuit Courts" of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. "33 The Districts were 
grouped into three "Circuits," and the Circuit Courts were presided over by 
a District Court Judge and two Supreme Court Justices. These Circuit Courts 
were given original jurisdiction over "all crimes and offences cognizable 
under the authority of the United States" with some irrelevant exceptions, 
and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts over crimes within their 
original jurisdiction. They also served as appeals courts from District Court 
cases.34 
The Substantive Law of 1790 
The Definition. The substantive law relating to "piracy" was the Act of 
30 April 1790, the pertinent part of which says: 
8 .... That, if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, 
haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or 
any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of 
the United States be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or 
other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any 
goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel 
voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, 
thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to 
his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken 
and adjudged to be a pirate and felon and being thereof convicted, shall suffer 
death ... 35 
Sections 10 and 11 of that Act extend the same punishment to "any person" 
knowingly assisting or advising any other person "to do or commit any 
murder or robbery, or other piracy aforesaid, upon the seas" and provide for 
imprisonment and fine for those who help the "pirate or robber" after the 
fact. Under section 12, a separate offense subjecting the offender to 
imprisonment and fine is created for "any person" who commits 
manslaughter upon the high seas, or attempts to corrupt any member of a 
ship's company to yield to pirates or to turn pirate or to trade with any pirate 
knowing him to be such, and any "seaman" who confines the master of any 
ship or endeavours to "make a revolt in such ship." 
There appear to be no statutes requiring those hunting pirates to get letters 
of marque and reprisal or any other license from the federal authorities.36 
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The notion that "piracy" was a gap-ruling legal conception relevant only 
when no territorial jurisdiction applied, and that the normal rules of 
jurisdiction would apply to limit a state's jurisdiction to traditional bounds, 
i.e., not to apply to the acts of foreigners without minimal contacts with the 
United States on which criminal jurisdiction could be based, appeared very 
early despite the "any person" language of the statutes. A Captain Hickman 
(nationality not specified) in 1792 appears to have landed in tlieFrendi colony 
of Martinique and absconded with some slaves, which he landecrmGeo-rgia--
and tried to sell. The Attorney General, Edmund Randolpli, advised 
sec;tary of State Thomas Jefferson on 1 November 1792 that "the offence 
would seem to be piracy; but it may prove, when the precise place of its 
commission shall be fixed, to be of a merely municipal kind," implying that 
the French jurisdiction would exclude American even though the "pirate" 
was caught within the territorial jurisdiction of an American court. The 
opinion also sheds some light on the original intention of the provision of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 extending the jurisdiction of District Courts to the tort 
claims of aliens alleging the tort to be a violation of the law of nations. 
Randolph instructed the United States Attorney (the federal District Court's 
prosecuting official) in Georgia "To prosecute the culprits criminaliter, as far as 
the law will permit," and Randolph went on: 
If the criminal process should be insufficient to procure [the restitution of the slaves to 
their owner in Martinique], to institute the necessary civil process for the like purpose, 
with the approbation of the owners or their agent. The last remark is made in order to 
impose the expense of a suit upon the individuals interested, rather than to assume any 
responsibility on the United States.37 
Apparently, the alien tort claims provision was envisaged by Randolph as a 
supplement to criminal process to permit the victim of a wrongful taking 
abroad to recover his property when the tort law of the place of taking and 
the tort law of the United States coincided and the taker or the property was 
in the territorial jurisdiction of American courts. It would have had obvious 
applicability to aliens seeking to recover their goods from "pirates" as well as 
from those taking their property abroad, but seems to have rested on 
Blackstone's naturalist conception of the "law of nations." 
Further indications exist of the jurisdictional limits felt to be implicit in the 
international system and not overcome by general words applying to "any 
person" in statutes relating to "piracy." In 1795 some Americans who had 
helped plunder the British colony of Sierra Leone were apprehended in the 
United States. Attorney General William Bradford advised Edmund 
Randolph, now Secretary of State: 
So far, therefore, as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a foreign 
country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts; nor can the actors be legally 
prosecuted or punished for them by the United States. But crimes committed on the high 
seas are [emphasis sic] within the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of the 
United States; and, so far as the offence was committed thereon, I am inclined to think 
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that it may be legally prosecuted in either of those courts in any district wherein the 
offenders may be found. But some doubt rests on this point .... 33 
Again, the relationship between criminal and civil jurisdiction was noted, 
and Bradford went on: 
But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by 
these acts ... have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States;jurisdiction 
having been expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort 
only, in violation of the laws of nations ... ; and as such a suit may be maintained by 
eviden~ taken at a distance, on ;~~~ission issued for that purpose, the difficulty of 
obtaining redress would not be so great as in a criminal prosecution, where viva voce 
testimony alone can be received as legal proof.39 
The first hint that "piracy" might be a crime of universal jurisdiction as far 
as the United States was concerned came in 1798 when the Attorney General, 
Gharles Lee, advised the Secretary of St~te~-i.:~;t1Y-Pickering, that an 
extradition request from Great Britain for three' "murderers" 'under the 
'terms-oftlie]ayTreaty of 1794,40 could be denied: 
The criminal tribunals of the United States are fully competent to try and punish persons 
wh~ commit murder on the high seas, or pi!"acy, as may appear from the 8th ... [section] 
of the a:ct of 3~1:h April, 1790. One of the persons (Brigstock) is a citizen of the United 
States; -;'nd it is not to be reasonably expected that his country will not exercise the right 
of trying him .... [The other two may also be Americans.] But, supposing them to be 
foreigners, the stipulation in the 27th article [of the Treaty of 1794] is not applicable to 
their case; and as they are triable in the courts of the United States ... I deem it more 
b,ecoming the justice, honor, and dignity of the United States, that the trial should be i~ 
our courts.41 
The hint is not too broad. Not only was there an undoubted link of 
nationality on which to base jurisdiction over Brigstock, and what seems to be 
a hope that the same link would be found with regard to the other two, but the 
crime involved in the British request was not "piracy" at all; it was "murder" 
within the terms of the treaty. The rationale does not £low from an analysis of 
the crime of "murder on the high seas" being included in the concept of 
"piracy" and therefore subject to universal jurisdiction, but, although it is not 
clear what the basis was for Americanjurisdiction if not nationality, from a 
direct jurisdiction asserted over "murderers" whose acts were committed on 
the high seas. The assertion of a universal jurisdiction over "murder" on the 
high seas, if such it was intended to be, was based on the competence of 
American courts as set forth in the statute of 1790, not on any analysis of 
public international law or any measuring of the statute's provisions against 
the legal powers under public international law of the United States to assert 
jurisdiction over the criminal acts of foreigners on the high seas. Apparently 
the desire to uphold that jurisdiction as a matter of American policy, and to 
state it in terms that would apply equally to "piracy" and, indeed, any other 
"crime" defined by an American statute, would serve equally well as a direct 
assertion of universal jurisdiction. The logic of the opinion would support the 
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effectiveness in American law of any statute applying to any person on the 
high seas, and seems to challenge the British government to find a reason in 
international law why the American assertion was wrong. No British 
response to this position has been found. 
Indeed, on closer examination, the position taken by Attorney General Lee 
seems to have been both unnecessarily broad and unnecessarily narrow. If the 
accused committed their "murder" from or in an American vessel, and 
British assertions of jurisdiction were based on some effects on British 
subjects or in a British vessel, there would seem to have been an overlapping 
jurisdiction. If the "murder" had been done solely in a British vessel with no 
American contacts other than the nationality of one of the accused murderers, 
the assertion seems extreme that American jurisdiction existed over accused 
(possibly British) foreigners for their acts in a British vessel (presumably, 
from the fact of the extradition request) on the basis that "the high seas" was 
within concurrent territorial jurisdiction of all states including the new 
United States of America~Such an assertion, denying the exclusiveness of flag 
state jurisdiction over its~own nationals in its own vessels on the high seas, 
seems a formula for universal policing of everything at sea, and was surely 
more than the United States would have conceded to Great Britain with 
regard to American nationals in American vessels. Al though the full facts are 
not before us, it seems likely that Lee was making a broader argument for new 
national pride and policy reasons than a closer examination of the case and 
more mature judgment would warrant. 
Narrower arguments were available. The same treaty of 1794 in fact 
devotes several articles to the treatment of privateers and pirates. If it had 
really been Lee's position that the accused were "pirates," and not 
"murderers" subject to extradition under the peculiarly narrow terms of the 
treaty, the terms related to "pirates" would have applied and extradition 
denied on the narrow ground that the treaty envisaged a distinction between 
the two crimes and that the "murder" provision simply did not apply. Why 
Lee chose to make a wide assertion of American jurisdiction over 
"murderers" on the high seas as distinct from "pirates" is not known, but 
extreme "positivism" by policy-oriented officials not charged with judicial 
responsibilities can be seen from time to time in many newly independent 
states (and occasionally in some very old states), and there is no reason to 
think that the officials of the United States of America in its early days were 
immune from the same urge to flex the muscles of statehood until its full 
implications were reached. 
A similar position was asserted by Attorney General Lee a few months 
later, when the United States Attorney in Yorktown, Virginia, asked for 
guidance with regard to the ship Nigre, taken as a prize by the U.S.S. 
Constitution during the undeclared war with France and found to be of 
doubtful flag. On 20 September 1798 Lee replied (sending a copy to the 
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Secretary of State), that if the ship is a "pirate," all its crew, of any nations, 
can be tried in the United States Circuit Court for Virginia. Property rights in 
the ship and her cargo, on the other hand, were directed to be submitted to the 
District Court in Virginia "according to the laws of congress, and the usage 
and practice of admiralty in prize cases. "42 
That Lee's policy-maker-positivist approach was not universally shared in 
the United States in the 1790s is evident from the terms of the Treaty of1794 
itself. The principal American negotiator of that Treaty with Great Britain 
was John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
(1789-1795). It is therefore not surprising that many ofits terms were devoted 
to technical legal problems of assuring that property claims deriving from 
possible illegal captures at sea by both sides, as well as many other problems of 
debt collection and land tenure, were addressed. Three articles are pertinent 
to this study. 
Article 19 deals with men of war and privateers who commit outrages 
against the persons of the other side under color of their commissions. In such 
a case, the treaty provides that "they shall be punished, and shall also be bound 
in their persons and estates to make satisfaction and reparation for all 
damages, and the interest thereof, of whatever nature the said damages may 
be." Nowhere in the article are they referred to as "pirates" or as "deemed to 
be" or "treated in the same way as" "pirates." It appears that all action in 
excess of a commission was to be compensated by "sufficient security by at 
least two responsible sureties, who have no interest in the said privateer" 
placed before a "competent judge." It is possible that under an approach such 
as this, Captain Kidd would have gone free, although that is doubtful in view 
of the emphasis in his trial given to his failure to submit his captures to a prize 
court.43 
Article 20 deals directly with "pirates" as such: 
It is further agreed that both the said contracting parties shall not only refuse to receive 
any pirates into any of their ports, havens, or towns, or permit any of their inhabitants to 
receive, protect, harbor, conceal or assist them in any manner, but will bring to condign 
punishment all such inhabitants as shall be guilty C?f such acts or offences. 
And all their ships, with the goods ... taken by them and brought into the port of 
either .. , shall be seized ... and shall be restored to the owners ... even in case such 
effects should have passed into other hands by sale, if it be proved that the buyers knew 
or had good reason to believe or suspect that they had been piratically taken. 
It appears to be assumed in this article that the definition of "pirate" was 
known to both parties, and from the emphasis on returning property to its 
owners it appears that the definition was related to wrongful takings of 
property-robbery within the jurisdiction of Admiralty courts, presumably. 
There is no hint of a broader definition in the text. 
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This reading of article 20 of the 1794 Jay Treaty is verified by article 21: 
And if any subject or citizen of the said parties respectively shall accept any foreign 
commission or letters of marque for arming any vessel to act as a privateer against the 
other party, and be taken by the other party, it is hereby declared to be lawful for the 
said party to treat and punish the said subject or citizen having such commission or 
letters of marque as a pirate. 
It would appear that the national legislation of each party making it 
"piracy" for their respective nationals to accept privateering commissions 
from third parties to act against their own countryM was not regarded as 
codifying a more general rule of international law forbidding adventurers 
taking foreign commissions, but only as an aspect of the national law related 
to treason.45 The fact that such activity was regarded as not covered in the 
preceding article referring generally to "piracy" without any definition, but 
was the subject of an article of its own, and that a very limited one merely 
expanding the national rule to cover acts undertaken against only the other 
party under color of a foreign commission, seems to indicate that the drafters 
of the treaty did not regard taking a foreign commission as part of the basic 
conception of "piracy" in 1794. Article 21 itself did not even clearly say that 
the forbidden activity by subjects or citizens of each was "piracy," but only 
that if either party were injured by such activity it could lawfully as far as the 
treaty partners were concerned treat and punish a perpetrator of the other 
nationality as it would treat one of its own people acting under such a 
commission against the capturing state, "as a pirate." Thus it appears that to 
the drafters of the Jay Treaty of1794, "piracy" was indeed a crime punishable 
by the municipal law of either party, but the jurisdictional rules and the 
applicability of the law to foreigners, including those of the other treaty 
partner's nationality, were not clear, and the substance of the "crime" itself 
was related to the English legal conception of "piracy" being a municipal law 
crime equivalent within the traditional English Admiralty jurisdiction to 
robbery on land. It did not clearly include "murder." 
These provisions of the Jay Treaty were in fact personally drafted by John 
Jay.46 The distinctions between privateers exceeding their commissions, 
nationals accepting foreign commissions, and "pirates" reflected instructions 
drawn up by Edmund Randolph as Secretary of State pursuing an outline 
prepared by Alexander Hamilton.47 
Pinckney's Treaty, the Treaty of 27 October 1795 between the United 
States and Spain, follows a similar pattern with variations. There is no 
provision regarding persons on either side exceeding their privateering 
commissions. Nor is there any provision requiring each side to bring 
"pirates" and those who consort with them to condign punishment. The 
reasons for these omissions are not clear from available secondary material. In 
place of Jay's statute-like language regarding the return to owners of ships 
and goods "ifit be proved that the buyers knew or had good reason to believe 
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or suspect that they had been piratically taken" is a much more general 
obligation seeming to envisage either national enforcement through 
implementing legislation along the lines of Jay's language, or simple political 
handling without the involvement of courts and judges: 
Each Party shall endeavor by all means in their power to protect and defend all Vessels 
and other effects belonging to the Citizens or Subjects of the other, which shall be 
within the extent of their jurisdiction by sea or by land, and shall use all their efforts to 
recover and cause to be restored to the right owners their Vessels and effects which may 
have been taken from them within the extent of their said jurisdiction whether they are 
at war or not with the Power whose Subjects have taken possession of the said effects.4S 
Some indication that the principles of this article were intended specifically 
to apply to "pirated" goods and vessels, and not just those of foreign privateers, 
is in a later article specifically applying the general principles to "pirates," but 
with no greater legal detail of a sort that would be helpful to a judge: 
All Ships and merchandize of what nature soever which shall be rescued out of the hands 
of any Pirates or Robbers on the high seas 49 shall be brought into some Port of either 
State and shall be delivered to the custody of the Officers of that Port in order to be 
taken care of and restored entire to the true proprietor as soon as due and sufficient proof 
shall be made concerning the property thereof.50 
Another article treats "pirates" as if a natural hazard comparable to 
weather: 
In case the Subjects and inhabitants of either Party with their shipping whether public 
and of war or private and of merchants be forced through stress of weather, pursuit of 
Pirates, or Enemies [sic], or any other urgent necessity for seeking of shelter and harbor 
to retreat ... they shall be received and treated with all humanity. : .. 51 
The only other mention of "pirates" in the Treaty seems to be in article 14, 
closely paralleling article 21 of Jay's Treaty. It concludes that a citizen or 
subject of either side taking commissions or letters of marque to act against 
the subjects or property of the other side "shall be punished as a Pirate. "52 
This seems considerably more direct than the equivalent term of Jay's Treaty 
which merely made it lawful as a matter of bilateral treaty for each party to 
treat an illegal licensee of the other nationality as a "pirate," but did not 
require such treatment, and seems much more doubtful that such treatment 
was proper as a matter of international law. Since there are no known 
prosecutions for "piracy" under these provisions, and no known diplomatic 
correspondence concerning the interpretation of these terms of the two 
treaties, it seems unnecessary to analyze the differing conceptions of the 
negotiators of the two documents any further. 
American courts in the first decades of the 19th century tried to translate 
the statutory language into rules that could be administered to achieve the 
political results they supposed were intended. In doing so, they did not have 
the freedom of policy-making positivists like Attorney General Lee to 
interpret their conceptions of law into clear rules on the basis of their 
perceptions of the political interest of the United States or pride in their 
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hard-won independence. The most articulate judges took a basically 
"naturalist" view when trying to expand by interpretation the conceptions 
embodied in the language of the statute, but were held back by the deep 
Common Law traditions of judicial restraint and various natural law 
perceptions antithetical to expansive interpretations, like the notion that an 
accused criminal must have clear notice of the substance of the rule he is 
supposed to have transgressed. The judges were deeply split in their 
perceptions of the natural law and the balance to be struck by the competing 
legal, as well as policy, interests. 
The leading judge seeking to expand the definition of "piracy" and the 
jurisdiction of American courts to deal with it, was Joseph Story of 
Massachusetts, who sat on the Supreme Court 1811-1845. In two cases in 1812 
he set out his reasoning. 
The first case involved a taking by the defendants, Tully and Dalton, of an 
American vessel, the George Washington, while Uriah P. Levy, its Captain,53 
was not on board. Since he was not put in "fear," as the Common Law of 
"robbery" would have required (the taking was thus more akin to the 
Common Law crime of embezzlement-the unlawful taking by a person with 
right to possession), to the degree "piracy" was supposed to be only 
" robbery" within Admiralty jurisdiction, the taking was not" piracy. " Judge 
Story charged the jury in the Federal District Court that" at the common law, 
the offence of piracy consisted in committing those acts of robbery and 
depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed on land, would have 
amounted to a felony there. "54 This, of course, treats the entire operative part 
of the statutes of1536 and 1700 as if containing a single definition of "piracy, " 
making even the least "felony" within the jurisdiction of the Admiral into a 
capital offense. There is no known precedent for that position in English 
cases, and no evidence that the Congress intended that result when passing the 
statute of1790. Nonetheless, Judge Davis concurred with Story and the two 
defendants were convicted of "piracy." 
The logic used by Story and Davis deserves some closer examination. 
Story's assertion, that piracy was an offense at Common Law and as such was 
identical to depredation upon the high seas which if committed on land would 
have amounted to felony there, was taken verbatim from Blackstone.55 But 
where a careful analysis of the precedents shows Blackstone to have written 
more than the actual cases would bear, apparently accepting as persuasive, at 
least, some of the more extreme dicta of Sir Leoline Jenkins as to the 
definition of "piracy" under English municipal (but not technically 
"Common") law, Story used Blackstone's summary as a base for further 
expansion of the concept. "It was not necessary by the common law," Story 
wrote, "that the offense should be committed with all the facts necessary to 
constitute the technical crime of robbery. "56 Abandoning this line oflogic 
before facing the obvious problems of showing which facts should be 
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disregarded in holding something technically not "robbery" within the 
Admiral's jurisdiction to be nonetheless "piracy" as a matter of Common 
Law, Story adverted to the statute of 1790. In his view the "crime" of 
"piracy" in the United States from 1790 on included the acts of "any ... 
mariner of any ship [who] ... shall piratically and feloniously run away with 
such ship"S7 regardless of whether such running away had been "piracy" at 
English Common Law. All that was needed under the statute, said Story, was 
"piratical and felonious intent."s8 The logic by which statutory language 
under which the adverbs "piratically and feloniously" which modify the act, 
"run away," become indicators of "intent" is not entirely clear, but it does 
not seem outrageous. Story did not explain the linkage, which presumably 
rested on distinguishing between running away with the vessel to avoid a loss 
to the owners, which would not be a crime, and running away with an intent 
to convert the vessel or cargo to the mariner's own use, which Story felt 
should be a crime, even if not "piracy." He concluded merely: "After much 
reflection ... I remain of the same opinion that I expressed at the trial," 
affirming as part of an appeal panel in the Circuit Court the charge to the jury 
he had given as a trial judge in the District Court. 
But there is a missing step; the intent to convert the ship or cargo coupled 
with the running away might well properly be denominated a crime, but was 
it "piracy," warranting a death penalty? Judge Davis focused on that 
question, concurring with Story's conclusion on the basis of a citation to 
Molloy which, in the original, says merely: 
If a Ship shall ride at Anchor, and the Mariners shall be part in their Ship-Boat, and the 
rest on shore, and none shall be in the Ship, yet if a Pirat shall attacque her and rob her, 
the same is Piracy. 59 
While it might well be argued that this passage in Molloy is part of a series 
of sections fixing technical limits to the crime of "piracy" and not intended to 
be used as a basis for expanding the definition by analogy to cases in which the 
technical definition of "robbery" could not be applied to the acts treated in 
particular statutes and isolated cases as if "piracy, ': there is room for opinions 
to differ. Tully was hanged and Dalton eventually pardoned because the 
judges were convinced he was contrite. 
Another case (in 1818, U.S. v. Howard and Beebee),60 illustrates the 
definitional problems inherent on the Act of 1790. Defendants were pilots in 
Delaware who had guided a suspicious vessel to anchorage and were now 
accused of helping the absconded master and crew of that vessel in violation 
of section 12 of the Act of 1790 forbidding assistance to "pirates." The 
question was whether, to fit section 12, the "pirates" being helped had to have 
been shown to have violated section 8,61 thus whether a full-scale hearing had 
to be held on the misdeeds and the legal classification for those deeds of people 
not before the court. Bushrod Washington, like Story a participant in the 
Supreme Court majority decision in U.S. v. Palmer shortly before,62 had to 
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retreat like Story from his expansive naturalist position. Like Story he did so in 
practice while trying to preserve his position in theory. In the Palmer case, the 
acts of foreigners against foreigners only was held not to be "piracy" within the 
intent of section 8 of the Act of 1790, according to Washington, apparently 
mixing the jurisdictional problem with the question of the substantive defInition 
of the term. Continuing along the same line, Washington charged the Jury that 
if the defendant is properly within the scope of American jurisdiction, and in 
this case he clearly was since "the pilot boat is an American vessel, and the 
persons on board were citizens of the United States," then "The pirate [sic] with 
whom the confederacy and correspondence takes place, may, in our opinion, be 
any sea robber or pirate, according to the general law of nations." Section 12 
was thus severed from the restricted meaning of section 8 as it emerged from the 
Palmer case. But were the absconded persons "pirates" according to the general 
law of nations? To that question, Washington admitted doubts that only ajury 
could resolve. They might have been privateers acting solely against Spain 
"under a commission from the revolutionary government of South America 
(which would not amount to acts of piracy)," of the legal possessors of property 
which they were taking to their own use without the violence necessary to fIt a 
charge of "piracy ," merely criminals by the law of the flag of the vessel they had 
abandoned. These and other doubts he laid before the jury, which acquitted the 
defendants.63 The charge was never appealed to higher courts, thus the question 
of whether a general international law of "piracy" existed under which 
American courts could even indirectly exercise a universal jurisdiction over the 
acts of foreigners directed solely against foreigners beyond the limits of the 
Palmer case as expanded in the Klintock case, to be discussed below, was not 
completely resolved. 
Jurisdiction. It would appear from U.S. v. Tully and Dalton64 and from the 
passage in Molloy cited by Judge Davis that the English conception of the 
jurisdiction of the Admiral in England, which extended to all navigable waters, 
was applied to foreign waters also; that the phrase "high sea" had a somewhat 
different meaning than it has today, when it is distinguished from territorial 
waters. 
That this broad interpretation of the phrase "high sea" was in fact the 
interpretation held by Story and other expansive interpreters of the law needed 
to suppress "piracy," seems clear. In the other case in 1812, U.S. V. ROSS,65 the 
vessel was only a half mile from shore when the crew stabbed a passenger, and 
from two to six miles from shore when they threw his body overboard. Story 
declined to resolve the case on the basis of technicalities regarding the assault 
(stabbing) and the greater distance from shore when the passenger actually 
died or his body was disposed of. Instead he asked rhetorically whether the 
Act of 1790, section 8, in referring to "the high seas" was intended by the 
Congress to include foreign harbors. His answer was Yes. It means, he said: 
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[A ]ny waters on the sea coast which are within the boundaries of low water mark; 
although such waters may be in a roadstead or bay within the jurisdictional limits of a 
foreign government. Such is the meaning attached to the phrase by the common law; and 
supported by the authority of the admiralty, perhaps to a more enlarged extentY' 
To the extent this language was applied only to an American flag vessel and 
acts within it, it seems to be addressing a different set of facts than those 
envisaged by the jurisdictional provisions of the Act of1790, section 8. To the 
extent it was addressing facts within the contemplation of that statute, 
Story's reasoning seems inconsistent with the language of the statute, which 
clearly distinguishes between "high seas" and "any river, haven, basin, or 
bay," and specifically requires that in either case the act, to be within the 
terms of the statute must be "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." 
In sum, his conclusion supports universal jurisdiction with regard to 
"piracy," defined in the Tully and Dalton case to cover all Common Law 
felonies that might be committed on the "high sea," and views the "high sea" 
as including foreign territorial waters; there is no language oflimitation with 
regard to the flags of the vessels involved or the nationality of the accused or 
their victims. To the extent that construction rests on statutory language 
merely interpreted in the light of American municipal law (including the 
inherited concepts of English Common and Admiralty Law), it would seem to 
place the United States in a position of world policeman with regard to all 
felonies (by American definitions) occurring in any navigable waters. The 
underlying assumption seems to be the natural law of personal security, 
commerce and property, with overlapping jurisdiction available to all states 
to safeguard those natural rights. It is Molloy carried beyond Molloy 
himself,67 to the far reaches of Jenkins.68 
That this was in fact his view was confirmed some 20 years later when 
Story, in U.S. v. Pedro Gilbert & Others,69 held that the British had 
overlapping jurisdiction with the United States in a case in which he appears 
to have assumed that there were no British contacts at all except as world 
policeman. Despite the American legislation to be discussed below 
superseding the Act of 1790 in large part, Story applied the same section, 
section 8, of that Act, so the case is perhaps better discussed here than in its 
chronological place. 
The defendants were Captain and crew of a Spanish vessel which had 
allegedly attacked and robbed an American vessel on the high seas. The 
Spanish vessel was later found in port in Africa fitted out for slave trade, and a 
British warship acting under arrangements between Great Britain and Spain 
for the suppression of the slave trade arrested the crew and took them to 
England. The British then transferred the prisoners to the United States for 
trial on the American charge of "piracy" growing out of the first incident. 
The legality of the "extradition," or administrative transferrence of custody, 
was not at issue. The degree to which the British might have had jurisdiction 
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to try the accused for their attack on an American vessel was raised as a point 
by the defendants seeking to overturn their American conviction, and Story 
addressed the point in a long footnote: 
The British Government, on this occasion, finding [Spanish] persons in England in 
custody of one ofits own officers, accused of piracy on an American vessel, chose to send. 
those persons here, where the best evidence could be obtained, and where the greatest 
facilities and advantages for their trial were to be found. Over piracy, all nations 
exercise equal jurisdiction and the British Government might justly have exercised it in 
this case. But they preferred, that the offenders should be tried by the citizens of that 
country against whom the offence had been committed .... [Reciting the difficulties 
and dangers faced by the British commander, Captain Trotter, in capturing the 
accused.] Now what inducement had Captain Trotter to encounter all this, but a high 
sense of public duty, not merely to his own country, but to the commercial world.70 
It is apparent that to Story there was not only universal jurisdiction to 
apply to "pirates" a municipal law that reflected what he must have felt to be 
universal prohibitions against unlicensed violence at sea, but there were no 
inhibitions to that application except the practical ones of marshaling 
evidence. The decision not to try the accused in England was based not on any 
lack of a legal interest in their activities against a foreign vessel, but only on 
the practicalities of the particular case. The legal interest seems to have been 
felt to derive from a universal duty to the "commercial world" to safeguard 
property rights based on natural law, and not the particular law of any 
country. Since the defendants were in fact transferred to the custody of, and 
taken to trial in, the United States, a country that clearly had the legal interest 
necessary to support such action against Spanish or other objection on much 
narrower grounds, as the country whose property law had been violated by 
the Spanish attack on an American flag vessel, this long passage was 
unnecessary to the disposition of the issue. Moreover, in view of the position 
on this point of extraterritorial reach of American criminal jurisdiction, and 
the way in which "piracy" was regarded as an "American" rather than an 
"international" crime by the majority in the Supreme Court in cases to be 
discussed below, this footnote by Story can probably best be regarded as an 
expression of a deeply felt "naturalist" position by a learned jurist who had 
lost the jurisprudential argument at a higher level. While Story's position 
never was adopted as the legal position of the United States Supreme Court, 
and in the Pedro Gilbert case was expressed as mere dictum, thus did not take 
a position of legal significance for purposes of analyzing the law as it was 
actually applied, that approach has continued to seem persuasive to many 
jurists regardless of the dominance of positivism as the philosophy of the 
Supreme Court. Story's approach certainly represents a strain of legal 
thought that has been influential in the evolution of the law regarding 
"piracy" in the United States. 
Since the statute of1790 was taken by 1812 to define "piracy" for purposes 
of American trials, and trials of accused "pirates" could not be the subject of 
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foreign complaint based on the substance of the law defining "piracy" unless 
the accused "pirate" were considered to be beyond the proper reach of 
American prescriptive jurisdiction, the key question before the American 
courts was the proper reach of that jurisdiction. Story's approach, that all 
states have adequate territorial jurisdiction in navigable waters anyplace (by 
defining "high sea" to include a foreign bay or roadstead) subject only to the 
overlappingjurisdiction of other states, but not any notion of the territorial 
state having exclusive jurisdiction over its ships or close-in waters, was not 
wholly accepted even in the United States. Indeed, one of the very first 
surviving opinions of an American Attorney General, and one of the most 
emotional, was an opinion by Edmund Randolph dated 14 May 1793 to 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson holding that Delaware Bay (and by like 
logic Chesapeake Bay) was "internal waters of the United States and capable 
of being closed to foreign vessels" and totally subjected to American law.71 
Since Story's language was not restricted to instances of "piracy, "but rested 
on assertions of the Admiral's historical jurisdiction in English law for all 
felonies (which Story defined as "piracy"-all felonies within the Admiral's 
historical jurisdiction as viewed in England) it must have seemed intemperate 
to some of his colleagues concerned with limiting foreign exercises of 
jurisdiction in American bays and roadsteads. 
The question received a definitive answer construing the Act of 1790, 
section 8, in 1820. Bushrod Washington, sitting as a District judge in 
Philadelphia, had charged a jury in 1819 along the same lines Joseph Story 
would have used, that Peter Wiltberger, who killed a seaman on board an 
American vessel at anchor in the Tigris River in China, about 35 miles inland, 
14 miles below Canton, was acting on the "high sea" within the sense of the 
Act of 1790. Wiltberger was convicted.72 On appeal ultimately to the 
Supreme Court, the conviction was reversed squarely on this point. The 
Court, which included Justice Story, was unanimous; testimony to the 
persuasiveness of Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion, and the 
intellectual honesty ofJusti~e Story when persuaded of his error. Marshall 
took a strict positivist position. The criminal statutes must be construed 
strictly to protect individuals from the exercise of arbitrary power by judges. 
"The power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not the judicial 
department," he wrote. The legislative purpose in enacting the statute of 
1790, section 8, was not to assert jurisdiction over everybody any place, but 
only in a certain place, the high sea and rivers, havens, basins or bays outside 
the jurisdiction of any state. The Tigris River being wholly within the 
jurisdiction of China, the American courts cannot derive jurisdiction over the 
statutory offense from the words of the statute. Therefore, Wiltberger went 
free.73 Henry Wheaton, probably the most celebrated American scholar of 
international law of the first half of the nineteenth century, wrote a long 
analysis of the issue. In his view both Story and Marshall were right and 
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Story's retreat was not a retreat in principle: English Admiralty jurisdiction 
indeed extended into foreign ports, and American Admiralty jurisdiction 
could do the same. But, he concluded, the statute of 1790 did not go so far. 
Since federal criminal law in the United States rested on statute and not on 
Common Law except as embodied in statutes, the lesser description of 
jurisdiction contained in the statute limited the jurisdiction to less than the 
court could have exercised at English law. The fact that the Congress 
apparently did not intend to allow the court to exercise its full jurisdiction in 
cases of "piracy" in foreign waters meant that the court could not exercise its 
power over cases envisaged in the statute o£1790 beyond the limits set in that 
statute.74 Another statute could go farther without creating any legal 
problems in the international legal order, in his view. But as long as no statute 
in fact went farther, that issue would not have to be resolved. Wheaton 
apparently gave no weight to the policy and possible legal reasons why the 
Congress had not authorized the exercise of jurisdiction by American courts 
in cases occurring in foreign navigable waters. It seems noteworthy that 
Wheaton did not argue the obvious bases for jurisdiction, the flag of the vessel 
and Wiltberger's American nationality. Indeed, since the incident occurred 
within an American vessel, it is not clear why any international concept of 
"piracy" was thought to be involved, or any inhibition on applying American 
Admiralty prescriptions. Wheaton's sympathies obviously lay with the 
jurisprudential approach taken by Story as the entire point of his comment 
was to preserve the theoretical possibility of universal jurisdiction based on 
territorial principles and natural law against a Supreme Court majority 
(including Story himself) that had carefully taken a very different position. 
The question as to whether American jurisdiction cover~d acts by 
foreigners on the high sea against victims who were not Americans reached 
the Supreme Court in 1818. The holding in U.S. v. Palmer, et al.,75 among 
many other points,76 included the important rule of construction phrased by 
Chief Justice Marshall as follows: 
The constitution having conferred on congress the power of defining and punishing 
piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing 
pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence 
against the United States. The only question is, has the legislature enacted such a law? .. 
[No.] [N]o general words of a statute ought to be construed to embrace [offenses] when 
committed by foreigners against a foreign government.71 
Justice William Johnson dissented, going even further than Marshall and 
the majority in denying power to the legislature. In his view" congress cannot 
make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations in order to give 
jurisdiction to its own courts over such offences. "78 A consensus was reached 
in the "Certificate" customary at the time to blend the views of all the 
justices together on the broadest common position: 
[T]hat ... the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the high seas, on board of any 
ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign state, on persons within a 
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vessel belonging also exclusively to the subjects of a foreign state, is not piracy within 
the true intent and meaning of the act [of 1790, section 8] ... and is not punishable in the 
courts of the United States.79 
Shortly afterwards, indeed, after the passage by the Congress of further 
legislation whose effect was to overrule the quoted part of U.S. v. Palmer80 
but relating to facts occurring before that later legislation took effect, the 
Supreme Court reduced the impact of U.S. v. Palmer by asserting American 
jurisdiction in cases in which no particular foreign jurisdiction would serve 
despite the fact that the accused "pirates" and their victims were not 
American nationals. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in 
U. S. v. Klintock, a case involving a vessel sailing under the nominal control of 
an unrecognized Mexican authority during a revolution in Mexico, but 
exceeding any reasonable powers that could have been based on the laws of 
war. Klintock had seized a Danish ship ({animo furandi) }} and "not ... jure 
belli. "81 The capturing vessel was clearly "foreign." Marshall wrote: 
Upon the most deliberate reconsideration ... the Court is satisfied, that general piracy. 
or murder, or robbery, committed in the places described in the 8th section [of the Act of 
1790], by persons on board of a vessel not at the time belonging to the subjects of any 
foreign power, but in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and 
acknowledging obedience to no government whatsoever, is within the meaning of this 
act, and is punishable in the Courts of the United States. Persons of this description are 
proper objects for the penal code of all nations; and we think that the general words of 
the act of Congress applying to all persons whatsoever, though they ought not to be so 
construed as to extend to persons under the acknowledged authority of a foreign State, 
ought to be so construed as to comprehend those who acknowledge the authority of no 
State. Those general terms ought not to be applied to offences committed against the 
particular sovereignty of a foreign power; but we think they ought to be applied to 
offences committed against all nations, including the United States, by persons who by 
common consent are equally amenable to the laws of all nations.82 
The Certificate concludes: 
That the act of the 30th of April, 1790, does extend to all persons on board all vessels 
which throw off their national character by cruizing piratically and committing piracy 
on other vessels.83 
The case illustrates the problems of judges caught between a natural law 
orientation and positivist one. By natural law approaches, the rule towards 
which the Court was striving seems more or less clear. There is, in that 
conception, an underlying law forbidding interference with property as 
defined by any national legal system or by natural law , but that natural law of 
property yields to the positive law of any state within whose territorial or 
other traditional jurisdiction (such as the nationality of the possessor of the 
physical property) it comes. On the high sea, the law of the state whose flag is 
flying over a vessel authorized by that law to fly it, governs. A person acting 
outside that vessel, thus outside the flag-based jurisdiction traditionally 
analogized to territorial jurisdiction, can interfere in property rights only by 
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superimposing some other state's positive law ~n the positive law of the flag 
state. This could be done by capture or, perhaps, even sinking the first vessel 
and taking the property on board the capturing vessel or replacing the 
captured vessel's flag with the captor's. The law of naval captures and 
privateering evolved in Europe to prescribe the necessary rules as between 
the states of Europe and other states participating in the European legal order, 
such as the former European colonies in the Western Hemisphere and, if they 
wanted to participate in the system, the Muslim states of the Mediterranean 
Sea and some other societies that fit the pattern elsewhere, such as Thailand 
and China. Disputes over the lawfulness of the capture at sea and the proper 
disposition of captured property could as among these states be resolved by 
diplomatic negotiation, counter-captures under limited letters of marque and 
reprisal, or even the ultimate arbitrament of war. To the naturalist judges of 
the United States Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century, the word 
"piracy" could properly be used to attach legal results to captors outside the 
system; those who sought to change property rights by naval capture but who 
lacked the authority of a state within the system to supersede the law of the 
flag state of the captured vessel with any new positive law. And natural law 
would retain the rights to property in the holder prior to the capture. The 
function of the international law of "piracy," as it was then conceived, was 
thus to fill a gap in the legal order; to render punishable as "outlaws" those 
who operated outside the system and whose actions were inconsistent with 
the law within the system. All that was necessary for "standing" was that the 
acts of the "pirates" impinge upon the system somehow. Normally this was 
considered to flow from their taking of property against the rules of the 
system, i.e., without the authority of a state behind them, and from people 
whose property rights were blessed by the positive law of a state within the 
legal order. 
But the system, the legal order of Europe in the early nineteenth century, 
required "standing" of any "state" within the system before a municipal legal 
rule could be applied. In the case of captures at sea, the need for "standing" 
was supplied by some legally sufficient contact with the event, normally the 
connection, posited to rest on a fictitious "social contract," between the 
victim of the depredation and some state within the system. Attempts by 
"naturalist" jurists, like Story, to rationalize each state's authority to police 
the seas, foundered on the hard rocks of the legal order itself, which limit each 
state's jurisdiction to those cases in which the state has" standing. " Rhetoric 
of both naturalists and positivists in the late 17th century has been noted in 
which the legal order's requirement for "standing" was disregarded, but U.S. 
v. Palmer appears to be the first case in which a systematic treatment of the 
question was attempted in the context of a real case, and American 
"standing" was found lacking despite the apparent positivist decision by the 
Congress in 1790 to disregard the international legal order in authorizing 
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American courts to suppress an undefined "piracy." The naturalist reaction, 
to find "standing" in U.S. v. Klintock by applying natural law as part of 
Blackstone's concept of the "law of nations"-the natural law that is 
reflected not in the system of international distributions of authority to states, 
but in the common municipal laws of all states participating in the system-
filled the gap. Under that approach, all states would have had equal rights to 
apply their municipal laws related to "piracy," defined as robbery within the 
municipal law jurisdiction of the "Admiralty," that branch of the municipal 
court system that applied municipal law rules, including the law merchant 
and other rules labeled part of the "law of nations" by Blackstone, to the acts 
of foreigners against foreigners all on board foreign vessels, but only when the 
accused "pirates" had no state system within the legal order to license the 
taking in question. And even when the accused "pirate" was found flying the 
Jolly Roger or some false, non-authorized national flag, or flag of some 
unrecognized authority (i.e., some pretender to authority not accepted by the 
capturing state as empowered within the legal order to issue a license), the 
natural law background remained strong in Marshall and Story. The accused 
must have been caught engaged not in a taking that might be justifiable but for 
the lack of recognition, but in a taking that was robbery by the English 
municipal law of robbery, involving animum furandi, the intention to take for 
personal gain. Apparently, no middle ground was seen between such a taking 
and a taking jure belli, by the law of war, which was not "piracy" even if the 
taker did not have a license issued by a recognized authority. 
Clearly, the system implied in U.S. v. Klintock was incomplete; many fact 
patterns can be imagined that do not fit neatly into the categories supposed by 
the Supreme Court to fill the field. The principal gap fell in the contemplation 
of the availability of the law of war to unrecognized belligerent rebels such as 
the American forces had been a generation before-would it not have seemed 
monstrous to Chief Justice Marshall's generation if John Paul Jones had been 
hanged by the British not as a rebel but as a mere "pirate?"84 
The Substantive Law of 1819 
The Attempt to Avoid Problems of Definition, Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Commissions. The immediate result of U.S. v. Palmer in the halls 
of the Congress was the passage of a statute that simply ignored all the legal 
problems. The Act of3 March 181985 provided: 
Sec. 5 .... That if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit the 
crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders, shall 
afterwards be brought into or found in the United States, every such offender or 
offenders shall upon conviction thereof ... be punishable with death.86 
The Act of 1819 was limited in time to one year, and this section was 
continued without limit of time by section 2 of another statute passed on 15 
May 1820.87 This last Act with minor amendments, is still in force. as Instead of 
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defining the substantive law of "piracy," it refers to a definition supposed to 
be contained in the "law of nations;" instead of addressing the jurisdictional 
point raised by Justice Johnson and acknowledged in the Supreme Court's 
Certificate, it takes an assertive "positivist" position as to the extent of 
national jurisdiction apparently based on universality. 
The new statute was immediately applied. A foreign vessel putting out 
from "Buenos Ayres," the state now called Argentina formed out of the 
Spanish Vice-Royalty of La Plata by 1816, was seized by mutineers including 
Americans and turned to general "cruizing" without any commission from 
anybody. The question was the amenability of the crew to the jurisdiction of 
the American court before which both non-Americans and Americans had 
been taken. Chief Justice Marshall sitting as an appeals judge in the Federal 
Circuit Court in Virginia concluded: 
It was impossible that the act [of1819] could apply to any case if not to this. The case was 
undoubtedly piracy according to the understanding and practice of all nations. It was a 
case in which all nations surrendered their subjects to punishment which any 
government might inflict upon them, and one in which all admitted the rights of each to 
take and exercise jurisdiction. Yet the standard referred to by the act of congress ... 
must be admitted to be so vague as to allow of some doubt. The writers on the laws of 
nations give us no definition of the crime of piracy.89 
In view of Marshall's doubts as to the substance of the law, the jury was 
instructed to give a special verdict as to the facts alone, and the case was 
referred to the Supreme Court for argument as to whether there was any such 
thing as "the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations" within the 
meaning of the Act of 1819.90 
At the Supreme Court level the case was called u.S. v. Smith and became 
the leading case construing the Act of 1819. Justice Joseph Story wrote the 
Court's opinion. He wrote: 
There is scarcely a writer on the law of nations who does not allude to piracy as a crime 
of a settled determinate nature ... [R]obbery or forcible depredations upon the sea, 
animo furandi, is piracy.91 
His citations include a footnote seventeen pages long in which are cited 
many of the works analyzed above, including Blackstone, the trials of 
Dawson, Kidd and Green, and the writings of Grotius and W ooddeson, 
among others.92 To support the assertion that the English Common Law of 
piracy is identical with the substantive crime of "piracy " at international law 
he cited Hedges's and Jenkins's charges to juries quoted above,93 and 
Blackstone.94 There seems to be no independent legal argument other than 
long quotations from the various ancient authorities, and no distinction is 
drawn as to the jurisprudential bases for the various opinions or their possible 
inappropriateness to the narrow facts to which those opinions were applied. 
But Story's citations focusing on Marshall's single observation relating only 
to "the writers on the laws of nations," but not to the law of nations, or 
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international law , itself, seems to have convinced all but one of his colleagues 
on the bench. The one dissenter was Justice Henry Livingston, who read the 
words of the Constitution strictly to authorize the Congress to define 
"piracy," not just to refer to a foreign law, international law, for this 
purpose. In his view, a criminal statute, violation of which might result in 
hanging, should define the prohibited acts directly.95 The Certificate which 
issued disregarded Livingston's position and found the reference to the law of 
nations in the statute of1819 to be sufficient, and that law sufficiently clear, to 
justify hanging Smith, Chapels and the others.96 
The decision in U.S. v. Smith appears to have broken a logjam of "piracy" 
cases, all of which were summarily handled by the Supreme Court 
immediately afterwards. From the opinions loosely tied together in this series 
of cases under one heading, U.S. v. Pirates,97 it is clear that Justice Johnson 
was not fully convinced by Story and that there were many loose ends still 
remaining in the American approach to defining "piracy" and the scope of 
American courts' jurisdiction under the Act of1819. Justice Johnson found an 
American legal interest sufficient for "standing" in all the cases but one, and 
in that case the facts were found to bring the situation within the scope of U.S. 
v. Klintock-the defendants having acted so as to lose all national character. 
In U.S. v. John Furlong alias John Hobson98 the Certificate is explicit in 
finding a particular American basis for extending jurisdiction over the acts of 
the Irish defendant against an English victim: 
[I]t was not necessary that the indictment charge the prisoner as a citizen of the United 
States, nor the crime as committed on board an American vessel, inasmuch as it charges 
it to have been committed from [emphasis added] on board an American vessel, by a 
mariner sailing on board an American vessel.99 
The American contact was the flag of the attacking vessel. In the one case in 
which no American contact equivalent to this could be found, U.S. v. David 
Bowers and Henry Mathews, U.S. v. Klintock was the sole authority needed 
to support a Certificate holding: 
That the act [ of 1790] does extend to piracy committed by the crew of a foreign vessel on 
a vessel exclusively owned by persons not citizens of the United States, in the case of 
these prisoners, in which it appears that the crew assumed the character of pirates, 
whereby they lost all claim to national character or protection.1oo 
The other cases all involved major American contacts making it 
unnecessary to explore the possible incorporation of any rules of international 
law into the municipal law of the United States. 
Justice Johnson appears to have had serious reservations about U.S. v. 
Bowers and Mathews. In an unclear separate opinion adverting to the one 
case in which all the defendants are foreigners on board vessels owned by 
foreigners, he wrote that in his view U.S. v. Palmer was the controlling 
precedent rather than U.S. v. Klintock, apparently disagreeing with the 
majority that the foreign "pirates" had wholly cast aside their national 
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allegiances. Johnson nonetheless seemed to be willing to join with the 
majority on the strange rationale that while murder would not be triable in 
the United States other facts being the same, "piracy" being such a horrible 
crime in its very nature was amenable to Americanjurisdiction.10l But why 
"robbery" is to be considered more horrible than "murder," and how 
revulsion at the substance of the crime translates into rules of jurisdiction 
which must be resolved before any court erected by any municipal system can 
hear the substance of any accusation, is unexplained. 
Justice Story's expansive view of American jurisdiction to right the wrongs 
of the world was reflected also in two other cases in this series upholdingjury 
verdicts that labeled as "high seas" for the purpose of "piracy" charges, 
roadsteads within three miles of a foreign state's coast: "[FJor, those limits, 
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes. "102 The logic of U.S. v. 
ROSSI03 was apparently felt to be persuasive, perhaps in part because the Court 
remembered the origins of the American three-mile limit in a series of 
Secretary of States' almost arbitrary selections of a distance within which 
foreign gunboats could be excluded without offending any foreign powers in 
order to support American neutrality.l04 The notion that the Admiralty 
jurisdiction of all states extended as a matter of overlapping territorial 
jurisdiction to the navigable waters of the entire globe, rather than merely 
within the vessels of the various states, seems to be implicit in the holding. 
Substance Reexamined. In one respect the expanded view supported by 
Story lost in this series of cases. The defInition of the substance of the crime of 
"piracy" asserted by Story in U.S. v. Tully and Daltonl05 to include all 
"felonies" committed within Admiralty jurisdiction, not merely "robbery," 
was rejected by Story himself when forced to review the "writers" in U.S. v. 
Smith.106 
Congress adopted as a matter of positive law Story's view of the utility of 
the legal label "piracy" to condemn whatever crimes the municipal law 
system of the United States wanted to attach the label (and its legal results) to 
without regard for the historical evolution of the concept or the 
jurisprudential concerns that run through the earlier writings. The most 
notable legislation concerned the slave trade. Story loathed slavery as a 
matter of natural law . While little could be done to abolish slavery within any 
particular state of the new Union under the positive law compromises of the 
Constitution of 1787, the Congress had the power to regulate foreign 
commerce and as early as 22 March 1794 had enacted a law forbidding the 
involvement of any person within the United States in the carriage of slaves in 
commerce between the United States and any foreign country.l07 On 10 May 
1800 another Act forbade any American citizen or resident serving on board a 
foreign slave-trading vessel or holding any interest in the foreign slave 
trade. lOS The piracy statute of1819 does not mention the slave trade. But the 
renewing statute of15 May 1820 expressly makes it "piracy" with a penalty 
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of death for Americans to be engaged in the slave trade abroad or to detain 
" " " I " ·h h . I ( C h a negro or mu atto WIt t e mtent to ens ave except ror t e 
recapture of persons (!) already held in slavery by the operation of the law 
of a state of the United States).109 This use of the word "piracy" in 
connection with the international slave trade presumably represents an 
attempt by Story and others to develop the international law, as the "law 
of nations," by changing the municipal law of the United States, using the 
label, and hoping that other states in the international legal order would 
follow suit. To the extent that was the aim, it failed. 110 The American 
legislation remained municipal law in the United States, but the treatment 
of American active participants in the foreign slave trade as "pirates" 
before American courts did not make it "piracy" at international law any 
more than treason against the established order of England was made 
"piracy" in the international legal order by the hanging of James's (and 
Louis XIV's) Irish privateers in 1693.111 
The interplay between American municipal law resulting from the 
statutes of 1819 and 1820, and the international law regarding the slave 
trade, and the retreat Story was forced into against his own inclinations 
was made clear shortly afterwards when an American naval vessel under 
Lieutenant Stockton seized a French slaver off the coast of Africa and 
France denied American jurisdiction to consider the case. Story upheld the 
American jurisdiction in principle, but turned the vessel over to France 
with an elaborate opinion seeking to bind France to apply its municipal 
anti-slave-trade laws passed as a result of British pressures and the 
Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle.112 Story's reasoning is naturalist in holding 
the slave-trade to be a violation of the law of nations (because illegal under 
the law of all civilized states as well as in its nature inconsistent with 
Christian and universal moral principle). But he finds positivist reasons in 
policy for not applying the American municipal law: "The American 
courts of judicature are not hungry after jurisdiction in foreign cases, or 
desirous to plunge into the endless perplexities of foreign jurisprudence. " 
He did not mention "piracy" or explain why the perplexities of foreign 
jurisprudence would be pertinent to a "law of nations" case.ll3 
The issue appears to have been laid to rest in 1855. In that year a vessel sailing 
under the American flag was taken to Philadelphia under arrest for participating 
in the slave trade. The master of the vessel, Darnaud, was tried for "piracy" 
under the Act of14 May 1820 secs. 4 and 5.114 There was evidence that he was 
actually of French nationality despite the laws of the United States restricting 
masters' licenses for American flag vessels to American nationals. There was 
also a good deal of confusion as to the true ownership of the vessel, and it seems 
likely that a true American owner had attempted to mask his illegal operations 
behind various foreigners to whom title had been given, but not control or the 
legal capacity to transfer title further. Judge Kane charged the jury with regard 
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to the applicability of the American statute by which participation in the 
slave trade was made a species of "piracy:" 
[NJo State can make a general law applicable to all upon the high sea. Where an act has 
been denounced as crime by the universal law of nations, where the evil to be guarded 
against is one which all mankind recognize as an evil, where the offence is one that all 
mankind concur in punishing, we have an offence against the law of nations, which any 
nation may vindicate through the instrumentality of its courts. Thus the robber on the 
high seas, the murderer on the high seas, the ravisher on the high seas, pirates all of them, 
recognizing no allegiance to any country, because the very act violates their allegiance 
to all their fellow men, if caught, may be punished by the first taker. And so too, if the 
nations of the so-called civilized world, who are fond of calling themselves the whole 
world, and of arrogating to themselves somewhat too readily all the rights that belong to 
the whole world, could for once unite in defining that some one act should be regarded 
as a crime by all, it may be that after such an agreement by all the world, the courts of 
anyone nation might without reference to the nationality of the individual undertake to 
punish the offence he had committed. 
But so soon as we leave these crimes of universal recognition, the jurisdiction of a State 
over the acts of men upon the high seas becomes circumscribed. 
But it is only in the two cases, where the individual accused is himself a citizen ... or 
where the property upon which the individual was found perpetrating a wrong was 
properly recognized as American ... that the United States can make a law which would 
be binding upon all citizens or which could be enforced by courts of justice ; and I do not 
hesitate to say, after something of mature consideration, that if the Congress of the 
United States, in its honorable zeal for the repression of a grievous crime against 
mankind, were to call upon the courts of justice to extend the jurisdiction of the United 
States beyond the limits I have indicated, it would be the duty of courts of justice to 
decline the jurisdiction so conferred. 
That the offence is called in our particular statute piracy, does not vary the legal 
position .... Piracy is essentially an offence against the universal law of the sea. It 
assumes that the individual has thrown offhis allegiance to mankind. He is the enemy of 
all who meet him. The slave trade, however horrible it may be, is not within that 
category. lIS 
Under this charge, Darnaud was acquitted of "piracy. "116 The attempt of 
Justice Joseph Story to structure the American courts' approach to the 
international legal order in such a way as to enforce against foreigners 
whatever assertion of jurisdiction the Congress might see fit to make for 
policy reasons failed. The logic espoused by Judge Kane seems clear; it is 
based upon the existence of an international legal order that withholds from 
states the power to legislate with regard to the acts of foreigners abroad 
except in very narrowly prescribed cases. Participation in the slave trade, 
because consistent with the international legal order, even if horrible and 
possibly sinful, even if a violation of the law of nations in the Zouche-
Blackstone-Story sense of violating the municipal laws of all states, was not 
inconsistent with the international legal order; indeed it was part of the trade 
between states that is a reason for the existence of the international legal 
order. Thus, to Kane it must have seemed that Castlereagh was wrong at 
Aix-Ia-Chapelle and France and Sir William Scott were right:ll7 The law of 
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nations as it was reflected in the international law of the mid-nineteenth 
century was not conceived as the natural law evidenced by the concurrence of 
municipallegislation of all "civilized" states; itwas the positive law, with no 
moral component divorced from the assent of states, evidenced by treaty or 
practice which in turn depended on political evaluations of the desirability of 
concluding the treaty or engaging in the practice. 
It is perhaps worth noting explicitly that the Zouche-Blackstone idea 
that the law of nations, in the sense of the natural law evidenced by 
unanimity in the municipal laws of "civilized" states on some particular 
point, was part of "international law" in the sense of the law between 
states, seems to have bred more confusion than clarity in the minds of the 
naturalist jurists of the early 19th century. To legislators grappling with the 
practical problem of making rules for the governance of their societies, the 
idea that their rules, when coinciding with the equivalent rules of similar 
societies, represented the expression of some higher law and not of political 
choice was, to say the least, strange. They knew the argument and 
compromise that had been involved in drafting the rules and enacting them 
(through whatever political process). They also knew that what seems an 
incomplete trend or evidence of imperfect understanding of the underlying 
rules to a judge, teacher or other outsider, was more likely the balance of 
the political forces whose cooperation was necessary to the consensus 
process of legislation; that "imperfection" or "incompleteness" in 
expressing the "natural law" was evidence of the misperception of the 
outsider as to the "natural" rule, because the arguments that had resulted in 
the "imperfection" or "incompleteness" were sufficiently compelling, and 
reflective of important social interests, to be as "natural" as the arguments 
supporting a more sweeping rule. The evidence of the American experience 
of this time seems to have meshed with the evidence of British experience 
of the late 17th century and of this time as well, that rules of "international 
law" cannot be made binding on other states by the act of legislation or 
even judicial pronouncements of a single state or even a large majority of 
states. Thus, while a positivist approach to assertions of national 
interpretations of the law and its utility to express national policy even in 
international affairs resulted in legislation that used the word "piracy" in a 
sense desired by the national law-makers and in the hope of results in the 
international legal order,l1s that hope was futile. The structure of the 
international order, giving to each state the same powers of interpretation, 
make national legislation incapable of expressing "natural law" in a sense 
persuasive on others who do not share the identical perception of the 
"natural law." The argument by Blackstone, Story, Castlereagh119 and 
others is thus circular; it rests on the a priori acceptance of the rule by the 
state seeking to be bound to it by international law arguments based on 
principles already found unpersuasive to its municipal legislature. 
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This is not to say that the naturalist argument regarding underlying 
principles is wholly mistaken, only that its application to specifics can never 
be presumed.l20 The 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice , which 
is binding on all members of the United Nations and a few other states as 
treaty law even if not codifying generally accepted formulae, requires the 
Court to apply" general principles oflaw recognized by civilized nations" as 
part of the body of rules contained in internationallaw.121 Whether those 
"general principles" have anything to do with "piracy," and whether, if they 
do, they can be applied to anything else, remains doubtful in the light of the 
experience of the United States in trying to use them to expand the concept to 
cover the foreign slave trade and felonies other than "robbery" and in areas 
other than the high seas outside the territorially-based assertions of 
jurisdiction of any state, and to persons and incidents not related in legally 
significant ways to the state seeking to apply its law (or its conception of the 
international law) of "piracy." 
Jurisdiction Reexamined. Story's reasoning in the La Jeune Eugenie, 
declining to exercise over a wholly French vessel the American jurisdiction 
asserted in the Act of 1820,122 seems to reflect the policy underlying the 
distribution of legal powers, the jurisdiction of national courts and the 
problem of "standing" inherent in the international legal order. It is thus 
more compelling as a demonstration of the limits of "natural law" than of the 
substantive law regarding the .slave trade that Story felt truly reflected 
"natural law, " and which he declined to apply despite asserting a universal 
American jurisdiction both to legislate and to enforce American "universal" 
law against foreigners abroad. As Story's reasoning demonstrates, it is 
possible to assert this distribution of legal powers in the international legal 
order to rest on either natural law growing out of the structure of 
international society, or positive law-the convenience of the enforcing state 
in a particular situation-thus it is not necessary to resolve the jurisprudential 
disputes as to the best model to posit for an understanding of the international 
legal order. The policy argument given by Story will be very strong in any 
particular case. It, in turn, rests on unstated perceptions as to the convenience 
of the state system and narrower conceptions of territorial jurisdiction than 
he was willing to .admit openly. 
If this is so, then the "crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations" 
seems to be simply the extension of municipal laws relating to crimes labeled 
"piracy" for historical reasons, largely resting on confusion and polemics, 
and related to the international legal order by another confusion between the 
"law of nations" and the "law between states" the former being merely a 
collection of the similar municipal laws of states which regard themselves as 
the sole members of the system. The similarities seem to rest on policy reasons 
related to the needs of commerce, not on underlying natural moral and legal 
principles. Indeed, ironically, the underlying principles seem more nearly 
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related to the unwritten constitutional order of international society, and 
make the conception of a substantive "natural law" valid for all states because 
reflecting immutable substantive principles, inconsistent with the system and 
an impediment to a clear understanding of it. Story himself seems to have 
reached this conclusion by 1834.123 
In some other respects; what Story could not win by traditional legal 
argument based on natural law , he and his supporters were able to win briefly 
through changes in the positive law; by the blend oflaw, morality and policy 
in legislation by the United States Congress. The Act of 15 May 1820,124 in 
addition to extending indefinitely section 5 of the Act of 1819,125 and 
otherwise regulating the exercise of the powers of the President to authorize 
captures at sea, contained a new provision codifying Story's view as to the 
territorial reach of American Admiralty jurisdiction: 
Sec. 3 .... That if any person shall, upon the high seas, or in any open roadstead, or in 
any haven, basin or bay, or in any river where the sea ebbs and £lows,IZ,> commit the 
crime of robbery, in or upon any ship or vessel, or upon any of the ship's company of any 
ship or vessel, or the lading thereof, such person shall be judged to be a pirate; ... And if 
any person engaged in any piratical cruise or enterprise, or being of the crew or ship's 
company of any piratical ship or vessel, shall land from such ship or vessel, and, on shore 
commit robbery, such person shall be adjudged a pirate.1Z7 
The possibility of a clash of jurisdictions was noted with a proviso: 
Provided, that nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive any 
particular state of its jurisdiction over such offences, when committed within the body 
of a county [sic; this was obviously copied from the statute of 1536], or authorize the 
courts of the United States to try any such offenders, after conviction or acquittance 
[acquittal], for the same offence, in a state court. 
But the references to counties and to state courts makes it likely that what 
was in the mind of the Congress was not a clash between the United States and 
foreign countries, but between Federal and state authorities within the United 
States alone. On the other hand, the United States had not authorized any courts 
under the Constitution, except military tribunals and counsular courts, to hear 
criminal cases arising outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
and the high seas.l28 Thus the degree to which the territorial view of Admiralty 
jurisdiction, urged by Story and evident in many of the writings and cases noted 
above, was actually adopted by the Congress is doubtful. 
As was pointed out with regard to the positivism of Gentili, where 
concepts of natural law and inherent limits to sovereignty are not regarded as 
persuasive, policy arguments frequently are persuasive to reach the same 
results. It is frequently better to refrain than to exercise an assertable 
jurisdiction when inordinate expenses must be borne to transport witnesses 
and inordinate delays are involved when a court cannot be set up in the area of 
the acts over which a state seeks to apply its law. The British had solved the 
problem in 1700 by authorizing the establishment of colonial tribunals to hear 
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"piracy" cases. In 1820 the United-States did not have the same resources or 
distant interests involving sea power that the British felt. And even the most 
assertive positivist in the administration or the Congress at that time would 
not have urged that America establish a land-based court in territory ruled by 
a foreign sovereign with his own judicial system; to supersede, or even 
supplement a foreign judicial system and apply American law in a foreign 
sovereign's territory were major steps involving treaties129 or the extension of 
national sovereignty, colonization or imperial expansion, in disregard oflocal 
authority.130 The diplomatic and military consequences of such a policy made 
it inadvisable to apply it in distant territory at that time.l3l 
The practical restraints the intemationallegal order, with its emphasis on 
territory as the prerequisite for enforcement jurisdiction, fixes upon the legal 
powers of states to legislate effectively within that order through arguments 
based on the natural law evidenced by coinciding municipal legislation, are 
implicit in the leading American text of the period. Chancellor James Kent of 
New York in the first edition of his Commentaries on American Law (1826)132 
regarded the public law of nations as "enforced by the censures of the press, 
and by the moral influence of those great masters of public law, who are 
consulted by all nations as oracles of wisdom" and ultimately by "the penal 
consequences of reproach and disgrace" and the hazards of" open and solemn 
war by the injured party." But offenses that can be committed by individuals 
he considered as enforced by the" sanctions of municipal law ," specifying not 
individual acts of unneutral service when the state is seeking to maintain 
neutrality, or similar acts violative of national policy alone, but "violations of 
safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. "133 
"Piracy" he defined merely as robbery, or a forcible depredation on the high 
seas, without lawful authority, and done "animo furandi," citing U.S. v. Smith 
as authority for the assertionl34 and he asserted with Story that "There can be 
no doubt of the right of Congress to pass laws punishing pirates, though they 
may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence against the 
United States. "135 But he applied that broad language only to cases noted 
above in which the "pirate" had lost all his national character by acting "in 
defiance of all law, and acknowledging obedience to no government or fiat 
whatsoever." The Acts of1790 and 1819 as continued and expanded in 1820 he 
noted: 
Did not apply to offences committed against the particular sovereignty of a foreign 
power; or to murder or robbery committed in a vessel belonging at the time, in fact as 
well as in right, to the subject of a foreign state, and, in virtue of such property, subject 
at the time to its control. But it [the Act of1790] applied to offences committed against 
all nations, by persons who, by common consent, were equally amenable to the laws of 
all nations. l :l6 
He thus repeated the compromise on the Supreme Court noted by 
Wheaton, that allowed the wide assertion of jurisdiction urged by Story to 
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survive alongside a restrictive interpretation of the statutes under which that 
jurisdiction was interpreted to avoid a clash with foreign jurisdictions. And 
he emphasized the restriction by referring to the "particular sovereignty" of 
other states as a limit to American assertions, and to "common consent" as the 
basis for a wider exercise of jurisdiction if it were ever to be attempted. 
Foreign Commissions and Unrecognized Belligerents137 
The Statutes. The historical experience of the United States with 
unrecognized belligerents being classified as "pirates" dates back to 1777, 
with the licensees of the Continental Congress itself so classified by British 
statute.138 Those statutes envisaged the detention of American privateers as 
"pirates," with a possibility of criminal trial at Executive discretion in 
England. There appear to have been no prosecutions for "piracy" as a crime 
either under the law of England or under international law growing out of the 
licensed activities of American privateers during the War. American 
privateers conducting captured vessels into neutral ports during those years 
were either welcomed on terms of equality with other belligerent vessels or 
turned away after British protest. The British authorized reprisals against 
Dutch shipping in retaliation for the Dutch refusing to deny port facilities to 
American privateers; but there seems to be no instance of a licensed American 
privateer actually being treated as a crimina1.139 In one instance British 
correspondence protested host state favors to an American naval officer as a 
breach of international obligations related to "piracy," but the context is 
political and the legal argument seems obscure.140 
The use of the word "pirate" in what appears to have been a municipal 
criminal or administrative law context, but actually as a mere pejorative, and as a 
legal basis in either British municipal law or international law (certainly 
municipal law; international law to the extent the privateers licensed by the 
Continental Congress were conceived to be exercising belligerent rights) for 
holding political prisoners without calling them prisoners of war, was thus 
familiar to the statesmen of the United States from the moment ofindependence. 
The United States, as a new state in the international order, preferred not to 
use the legal word in this way but did use it as a political pejorative without legal 
implications. Among the earliest treaties of the United States under the 
Constitution of 1787, aside from the Jay Treaty and Pinckney's Treaty with Great 
Britain and Spain respectively,141 were the treaties with the "states" of the North 
African Mediterranean littoral, the Barbary states.142 The word "pirate" was 
often used in the political rhetoric surrounding the so-called War with the 
Barbary Pirates, but in the actual conduct of hostilities, the normal laws of war 
and diplomatic and military intercourse were followed; the word seems to have 
reflected popular emotion only, not any legal classification.143 
The American statute of 1790144 contained a provision dealing with 
privateering done under color of a foreign commission. It was restricted in 
terms to American citizens taking such commissions, and thus rested its 
United States Law 155 
"standing" on the nationality of the accused "pirates." It separated 
conceptually the problem of commissions from the problems of "piracy" 
unauthorized by any public authority, thus for a full understanding of the 
American attitude towards depredations done by foreigners also under color 
of a foreign commission it is necessary to set it forth here: 
9 ••.. That if any citizen shall commit any piracy or robbery aforesaid, or any act of 
hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high sea, under 
colour of any commission from any foreign prince, or state, or on pretence of authority 
from any person, such offender shall, notwithstanding the pretence of any such 
authority, be deemed, adjudged and taken to be a pirate, felon, and robber, and on being 
thereof convicted shall suffer death.145 
This provision was left unchanged by the revisions of 1819 and 1820. The 
principle was expanded in 1847 during the war between the United States and 
Mexico of 1846-1848 through which the United States acquired California, 
New Mexico and Arizona, and ended Mexican claims to Texas. At that time 
the United States, as a matter of municipal law, extended the treatment as 
"pirates" even to foreigners acting under valid commissions by foreign 
governments if those commissions were inconsistent with the provisions of a 
treaty to which the United States is a party: 
That any subject or citizen of any foreign State, who shall be found and taken on the sea, 
making war upon the United States, or cruising against the vessels and property thereof, 
or the citizens of the same, contrary to the provisions of any treaty existing between the 
United States and the State of which such person is a citizen or subject, when by such 
treaty such acts of such persons are declared to be piracy, may be arraigned, tried, 
convicted, and punished before any circuit court of the United States ... in the same 
manner as other persons charged with piracy.1% 
The statute of1790 and its continuations apply only to Americans and, after 
1847, some foreigners acting against the United States. Its provisions do not 
reflect any acknowledged underlying customary law. A British assertion that 
Americans serving on French privateers in 1794 were "pirates" was denied by 
the United States;147 similarly, a French decree of 6 June 1803 classifying as a 
"pirate" vessel any privateer sailing against France two-thirds of whose crew 
were not subjects or citizens of a country at war with France, was considered 
by the United States to be inconsistent with the law of nations. 148 The question 
of Americans acting under foreign commissions against foreigners was 
answered as far as the United States was concerned by the Neutrality Act of5 
June 1794149 under which various unneutral acts by individuals within the 
territory of the United States were forbidden, including the fitting out of 
privateers to cruise against foreign powers. But only acts within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States were affected as it was apparently 
the American policy to regard mercenary activity by Americans, including 
privateering under foreign license (which could be very profitable indeed to 
the successful privateer), to be neither forbidden by any conception of the law 
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of nations applicable to individuals nor any violation of American neutrality 
under international law as applicable between states.lSO 
By 1854 it appears that even the British had accepted the American position 
that a regularly issued commission would remove the charge of "piracy" 
from nationals acting under third country commissions against yet other 
countries, and such a situation would not violate the neutrality of the 
privateers' own state if that state's territory or its own affirmative public 
policy were not involved. lSI Of course, municipal law or treaty could commi t 
a state to a different policy. In addition to various policy arguments, such as 
the possibility that Great Britain might some day want to be able to employ 
American seamen in British privateers sailing against a third power, the 
Americans argued successfully that "By the law of nations, as expounded 
both in British and American courts, a commission to a privateer, regularly 
issued by a belligerent nation, protects both the captain and the crew from 
punishment as pirates. "lS2 
The Early American Experience. There is no American statute relating 
expressly to foreigners sailing under foreign commissions other than these. 
Thus, a legal gap was left with regard to foreigners sailing under commissions 
of foreign authorities who are not accepted by the political branches of the 
government of the United States as the representatives of foreign states. To 
the extent those foreign privateers act only against foreign shipping, not only 
would the United States lack standing to try them for "piracy" under any 
definition, but even if the jurisdictional problem were regarded as solved by 
calling them stateless under the approach taken in U.S. v. Klintock,153 the lack 
of animo furandi, an essential element of the crime of "robbery, "would seem to 
take the privateers with doubtful license out of the conception of "piracy" as 
it evolved with regard to the" classical" application of Admiralty jurisdiction 
to hang foreigners acting abroad for violations of a municipal law relating to 
property rights on board ships of the prosecuting state. A different conception 
is involved relating less to the municipal law of "robbery " or "murder," and 
more to the international law of war involving unrecognized political 
societies or groups forming themselves into governments but not yet in 
control of all the levers of the political society they claim to govern. The 
conception relates in the statutes to Americans engaging in "hostility" 
against the United States, or foreigners "making war" on the United States in 
disregard of treaty obligations of their own state. The uses of the word 
"piracy" in this very different context than the "robbery within the 
jurisdiction of the Admiral" definition, caused a confusion of thought that 
persists to today. 
Ironically, the first form in which the key questions arose was with regard 
to commissions issued by the United States itself in 1798 authorizing 
privateers to cruise against French shipping.l54 Under the Constitution of 
1787, the American Congress has the legal power in the United States "To 
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declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water."155 On 7 July 1798 the Congress 
legislated "That the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the 
stipulations of the treaties ... heretofore concluded between the United 
States and France. "156 Two days later the Congress authorized the President 
to "instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels ... employed in the 
service of the United States, to subdue, seize and take any armed French 
vessel" and to grant equivalent authority through "special commissions" to 
the owners of "private armed ships and vessels of the United States. "157 Since 
there was no Declaration of War , the legal question was posed as to whether 
American commissioners acting under commission in the public interest, and 
not as licensed individuals in a "reprisal war, "158 could claim the rights of 
lawful combatants and whether Frenchmen captured by American privateers 
were to be treated as soldiers under the laws of war. In addition, the question 
arose as to whether an American taking a French commission or aiding the 
French was guilty of "treason" or of "piracy" under the "hostility" provision 
of section 9 of the Act of1790. The Attorney General, Charles Lee, addressed 
the questions in an opinion sent to the Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering, 
on 21 August 1798: 
Sir: Having taken into consideration the acts of the French republic relative to the 
United States, and the laws of Congress passed at the last session, it is my opinion that 
there exists not only an actual [sic] maritime war between France and the United States, 
but a maritime war authorized [sic] by both nations. Consequently, France is our enemy; 
and to aid, assist, and abet that nation in her maritime warfare, will be treason in a 
citizen or any other person within the United States not commissioned under France. 
But in a French subject, commissioned by France, acting openly according to his 
commission, such assistance will be hostility . . . [he] must be treated according to the 
laws of war.lS9 
The Latin American Wars for Independence. It being more or less 
established, thus, that as far as the United States was concerned, the facts 
should determine the legal classifications pertinent to any particular 
situation, and that the political act of "recognition" through the formal 
attaching of classifications like "war" to a factual situation was a clarifying 
and at times determinative step, but that the failure to make a formal 
"declaration" was not determinative, the courts found themselves in some 
difficulty during the wars for independence of the Spanish colonies in the 
Americas. 
The Romp of Baltimore sailed under a commission from the revolutionary 
government of Buenos Ayres and, as the Santafecino, cruised successfully 
against Spanish shipping. The laws of maritime warfare were fully observed. 
Available records do not indicate why the terms of Pinckney's Treaty with 
Spain were not applied to make the American involvement in the voyage of 
the Romp equivalent to "piracy, "160 but when the crew was arrested on 1817 
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and charged with "piracy" Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a Circuit Judge 
in Virginia, found the major issue to be whether the commission from Buenos 
Ayres was significant legally in the absence of "recognition" by the political 
branches of the American government, and whether, if not, the "robberies" 
against Spain committed by the Romp's crew fell within section 8 of the 1790 
statutory definition of "piracy:" 
The commissions should go to the jury, merely as papers found on board the vessel. But 
on the main question ... that a nation became independent from its declaration of 
independence, only as respects its own government .... That before it could be 
considered independent by the judiciary of foreign nations, it was necessary that its 
independence should be recognized by the executive authority of those nations. That as 
our executive had never recognized the independence of Buenos Ayres, it was not 
competent to the court to pronounce its independence. That, therefore ... the seals 
attached to the commissions in question prove nothing.161 
As to the law of "piracy" that would apply if the commissions were found 
by the jury not to endow the crew with an immunity from the law of "piracy" 
for the purposes of the case, Marshall reviewed section 8 of the Act of 1790 
and concluded in the light of a split of opinion between Justices Bushrod 
Washington and William Johnson that the law is "doubtful" as to whether to 
be "piracy" the depredation must be one that would be punishable by death if 
committed on land.162 With this confusing instruction he sent the case to the 
jury, which took only ten minutes to return a verdict of not guilty. 
The legal questions were given a much more elaborate treatment about a 
year later in U.S. v. Palmer et al. As to the substance of the question as to 
whether the phrase "punishable by death" in the Act of 1790 section 8 
modified the word "piracy" as well as the phrase "any other offences," 
Johnson, in his dissent to U.S. v. Palmer, took the opportunity to reiterate his 
views conscientiously opposed to capital punishment.l63 He also reiterated his 
interpretation of the Constitution to withhold from the Congress the power 
to make that "piracy" which by the law of nations is not "piracy" in order to 
give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offensesl64 and went much further 
with regard to the question of commissions by unrecognized public 
authorities: 
When open war exists between a nation and its subjects, the subjects of the revolted 
country are no more liable to be punished as pirates, than the subjects who adhere to 
their allegiance .... The proof of a commission is not necessary to exempt an individual 
serving aboard a ship engaged in the war, because any ship ofa belligerent may capture 
an enemy; and whether acting under a commission or not, is an immaterial question as to 
third persons: he must answer that to his own government.l65 
It is not clear whether the majority agreed with Johnson on these last 
points; Chief Justice Marshall exercised his usual genius for finding words 
that would satisfy all parties and resolve the case without actually taking a 
position. As noted above, the majority agreed with Marshall that acts by 
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foreigners exclusively against foreign individuals or vessels "is not a piracy 
within the true intent and meaning of the act" of 1790 section 8.166 
But what of Amercan defendants and foreigners who take American 
property at sea under a doubtful foreign commission? As to these, Marshall 
wrote: 
[I]f the government [of the United States] remains neutral, and recognizes the existence 
of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as criminal those acts of hostility which war 
authorizes, and which the new government may direct against its enemy .... This would 
transcend the limits prescribed to the judicial department.167 
This reiteration of the position taken so futilely a few months before in 
U.S. v. Hutchings at the Circuit Court level, was modified and expanded 
somewhat when Marshall drafted the "per curiam" Certificate to take 
account of Johnson's views and conclude the case by giving guidance for the 
future. After holding that acts by foreigners exclusively against other 
foreigners are not "piracy" within the sense of section 8 of the Act of 1790 
(not mentioning whether "piracy" at general international law), Marshall 
wrote for the Court: 
[W]hen a civil war rages in a foreign nation, one part of which separates itself from the 
old established government, and erects itself into a distinct government, the courts of 
the union must view such newly constituted government as it is viewed by the legislative 
and executive departments of the government of the United States. If the government of 
the union remains neutral, but recognizes the existence of a civil war, the courts of the 
union cannot consider as criminal those acts of hostility, which war authorizes, and 
which the new government directs against its enemy.16S 
As in U.S. v. Hutchings, Marshall (carrying the whole Court with him) 
concluded that the seal on a purported commission may be proved by such 
evidence as the circumstances permit even if there is no clear "recognition" 
of the seal-granting authority by the political branches of government, and if 
it cannot be proved, then the defendant may nonetheless otherwise prove 
himself to be in government service. 
This opinion did two important things from the point of view of this part of 
the analysis: (1) It impliedly applied the municipal law "robbery" conception 
to the international law concept of "piracy" by allowing that any 
commission, or even mere government service without a commission, could 
negative the animus furandi necessary for a "piracy" conviction at American 
law; and (2) while repeating the subservience of the judicial branch to the 
other two branches of the American Federal government, it allowed juries to 
construe the silence of those other branches as consent to whatever the jury 
might find to be the legal classifications for the purposes of the particular case 
best flowing from the facts introduced in evidence before the court. Thus, 
while allowing the political departments of government to "recognize" as 
facts for the entire government a labeling system that might bear no 
relationship to the labels that a jury objectively viewing the evidence might 
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find, the legal system was not to be crippled by the inability of the political 
officers of government to make up their minds as to the labels that would do 
most to advance American policy interests. They could continue to be as 
positivist as they pleased, but the law using the traditional tools of naturalism, 
reason and fundamental principle derived from conscience and experience, 
could act when policy did not intervene. The result of this approach was to 
separate the law of "piracy" from the law of war, which was conceived to 
apply to all public contentions of arms whether or not declared and whether 
or not all parties were "recognized" as states or governments.169 
In the light of the history of the American revolution and the policy 
followed during the undeclared war with France, this was hardly 
earthshaking, but it caused considerable confusion to the political arms, 
which felt they might be losing control of reality by permitting the judiciary 
to affix legal labels on the basis of evidence instead of on the basis of policy as 
examined by the political representatives of the Union. On 6 November 1818, 
shortly after the decision in U.S. v. Palmer et al. was announced, the Attorney 
General, William Wirt, responded to a request for legal guidance from Elias 
Glenn, the Federal District Attorney for Baltimore, in a case involving 
American privateers sailing under licenses issued by the organization headed 
by Jose Gervasio Artigas, the leader of the Uruguayan independence 
movement involved in struggles against the governments of Buenos Ayres 
and Portugal (which was still sovereign in Brazil). The easy answer might 
have been to rest not on the law of "piracy," but on the American Neutrality 
Act of 1794 forbidding American nationals taking foreign colors while in the 
United States.170 But, this statute had only a very narrow territorial 
application, did not apply to American nationals abroad, and was aimed at 
preserving the neutrality of the United States by forbidding American 
territory to be used for foreign enlistments or fitting out foreign warships. The 
only reference to "piracy" in the act is in its section 9: "[N]othing in the 
foregoing act shall be construed to prevent the prosecution or punishment of 
treason, or any piracy defined by a treaty or other law of the United 
States."171 The strictly territorial applicability of this statute had been 
assumed in 1796 by Attorney General Charles Lee, who had felt it necessary to 
explain why it was necessary to preserve the neutrality of the United States 
by controlling even the actions of foreign seamen; his language, while so 
general that it might be read to apply to foreign seamen abroad, cannot have 
been intended to apply so broadly because the neutrality of the United States 
cannot have been conceived to have been affected by that, and it is neutrality 
that is the subject: 
Mariners may be said to be citizens of the world; and it is usual for them, of all countries, 
to serve on board of any merchant ship that will take them onto pay .... In the acts of 
Congress passed for punishment of crimes against the United States, it is observable that 
mariners [sic] are forbidden to serve on a foreign ship of war, letter of marque, or 
United States Law 161 
privateer, but are left at liberty to serve on board a vessel merely engaged in 
commerce.l72 
To Wirt, the enlistment under Artigas's licenses was illegal under the act of 
1794, but if not, then it must have been "piracy" under the act of1790, section 
9. Since it is not clear that the place of enlistment was within the territory of 
the United States, it is not clear how the 1794 act was conceived to apply; and 
since it is not clear that any victim of the privateers was American, it is hard 
to see how section 9 of the act of1790 could apply. But Wirt seems to have 
been obsessed with his reading of U.S. v. Palmer et al. and U.S. v. Hutchings: 
If the prisoners fail in showing that our government had admitted the existence of a civil 
war between Artigas and Portugal, then the principles laid down in Palmer's case ... can 
have no application.173 
In that case, wrote Wirt, Marshall's position in the Romp case will result in a 
conviction for "piracy." In case that argument seemed unconvincing, Wirt 
found another by citing Vattel for the proposition that "the citizens of the 
United States cannot mingle in that war, on this hypothesis, without being 
guilty of piracy." But the citation given by Wirt does not support his 
conclusion, since it forbids only foreign recruitment, not enlistment.174 
Wirt raised also the possibility that if all else failed the American 
adventurers might be considered "pirates" under an unspecified Act of1817. 
The only Act that might fit his description provides: 
That if any person shall, within the limits of the United States, fit out and arm, ... any 
such [sic; there is no prior referent in the statute to justify the "such"] ship or vessel, with 
intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or 
state, or any colony, district or people, to cruise or commit hostilities ... against the 
subjects, citizens, or property, of any prince or state, or of any colony, district or people 
with whom the United States are at peace, every such person so offending shall, upon 
conviction, be adjudged guilty of a high misdemeanor.175 
He seems to have overlooked the limiting language "within the limits of 
the United States. "176 This series of confusions and citations to inapplicable 
statutes and writings seems good evidence of the desire of the Administration 
of President James Monroe to find a basis in the law for controlling the 
adventures of Americans in the free-wheeling revolutionary days of the early 
19th century Western Hemisphere without additional legislation. Indeed, it 
seems likely that stronger legislation to limit North Americans' adventures in 
Latin America could not have been passed through the Congress, in which 
representatives from the less sedate members of American society had a 
stronger voice than in the Virginia lawyer's appointed executive branch. 
Marshall's ambiguities were not sufficient. The defendants were acquitted 
without the jury leaving their seats, much to the fury of the Secretary of 
State, John Quincy Adams, who felt the acquittal showed a lack of character 
and ability in all those involved in the prosecution, including William Wirt, 
and the judges in the case; William Pinckney, the defense counsel, was 
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regarded by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Joseph Story as the greatest 
advocate to appear before them.177 
Examples of the practical difficulties of administering the terms of section 
8 of the Act of 1790 were given above,178 and the ambiguities were 
substantially increased by the possibility that a foreign commission might 
authorize the depredations observed or suspected by American licensees 
seeking to capture "pirate" vessels. As early as 1813, Bushrod Washington 
had tried unsuccessfully to use section 8 of the Act179 to limit the excessive zeal 
of foreign privateers. In U.S. v. Jones180 a jury in Philadelphia had before it a 
defendant from a vessel which had despoiled a Portuguese ship although, 
according to Washington, in the political struggle giving rise to Jones's 
foreign commission Portugal was a "neutral" as far as the United States was 
concerned. The facts are not entirely clear, but the defendant appears to have 
been an American, and Washington sought to have him bound by American 
neutrality not to participate in a struggle among foreign public authorities. 
No act of the Congress squarely touched the situation and Washington was in 
the same dilemma Wirt would try to bluster his way out of in 1818. 
Washington cited Jenkins, Molloy, Wooddeson and the Kidd case,181 "which 
latter case, "he wrote, "though decided at Common Law, is clearly bottomed 
upon the principles of the maritime law of nations, with which the Common 
Law in this respect agrees. "182 The fact of the defendant's commission having 
authorized depredations against Portuguese vessels Washington instructed 
the jury to be irrelevant if the defendant "knows, or ought to know, the 
orders to be illegal. " The act of "piracy" under the Act was apparently not 
necessarily either murder or robbery, but included any other act which would 
have been punishable by death if committed on land. Washington seems to 
have felt that this language of the Act of1790 did not expand the international 
law of "piracy" but codified it.183 The verdict was for acquittal, apparently 
on the basis of a possible mistaken identity between Jones and another 
defendant named Hancock, and some serious question about the credibility of 
some witnesses,184 so possible legal errors in the charge were never appealed 
to higher courts. 
Evolution of the Labels. Among the "piracy" cases dealt with at the Supreme 
Court level immediately after U.S. v. Smith in 1820185 was U.S. v. Griffen and 
Brailsford, in which the charge was applied to an American fitting out a vessel in 
an American port to cruise under a foreign commission against a foreign power at 
peace with the United States. The facts are not fully set out, but the Supreme 
Court's decision was that even if the "piracy" laws did not apply, the Neutrality 
laws of the United States did,186 and the defendant concerned was "not protected 
by a commission from a belligerent from punishment for any offence committed 
by him against vessels of the United States. "187 
Another was U.S. v. Holmes,188 in which the Supreme Court avoided the 
problem of having the judicial branch via a jury decision "recognize" the legal 
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power of an unrecognized authority (Buenos Ayres again) to issue valid 
commissions in disregard of the silence of the political branches of 
government by applying the rule of U.S. v. Klintock.189 Apparently it was 
hoped that a jury would find that "the vessel ... had, at the time of the 
commission [of the offense], no real national character but was possessed and 
held by pirates, or by persons not lawfully sailing under the flag, or entitled to 
the protection of any government whatsoever. "190 
It seems likely that the Supreme Court's difficulties dealing with these 
cases reflected a deep jurisprudential split between Story and Washington, 
the "naturalists," taking an expansive view of American jurisdiction to apply 
an international law of "piracy" to foreigners who interfered with foreign 
shipping in disregard of the legal order's normal demand for some "standing" 
in the state whose judicial arm had the accused "pirates" before it, and the 
"positivists," Johnson and Marshall, who insisted that, regardless of judges' 
perceptions of abstract "justice, " "reason" or the presumed needs of society, 
the jurisdiction of the American courts was restricted to such cases as the 
Congress by legislation had given to it, and who interpreted the intention of 
the Congress narrowly. The compromise as of1820 was to allow jurisdiction 
in those cases in which American "standing" could be supported in the usual 
way plus those in which no other state in the international legal order could 
assert a greater "standing" or legal interest. The limits of this approach were 
reached when the defendants derived their authority for committing 
depredations at sea from commissions issued by unrecognized foreign 
officials; the "naturalists" wanted to consider those cases as within American 
judicial purview, the "positivists" did not. 
Wheaton in 1836 attempted to summarize the American view and ended 
with the same split between broad assertion of jurisdiction and narrow 
citation to practice that was the result of the jurisprudential division within 
the Supreme Court. He wrote: 
Pirates being the common enemies of all mankind, and all nations having an equal 
interest in their apprehension and punishment, they may be lawfully captured on the 
high seas by armed vessels of any particular state, and brought within its territorial 
jurisdiction for trial in its tribunals.191 
This proposition, however, must be confined to piracy as defined by the law of nations, 
and cannot be extended to offences which are made piracy by municipal legislation .... 
The crimes of murder and robbery, committed by foreigners on board of a foreign 
vessel, on the high seas, are not justiciable in the tribunals of another country than that to 
which the vessel belongs; but if committed on board of a vessel not at the time belonging, 
in fact as well as right, to any foreign power or its subjects, but in possession of a crew 
acting in defiance of all laws, and acknowledging obedience to no flag whatsoever, these 
crimes may be punished as piracy under the law of nations in the courts of any nation 
having custody of the offenders.I92 
The interplay between the American municipal law and the international 
law of "piracy" as it might apply to political actors with commissions issued 
by unrecognized governments at this period was illuminated in a case decided 
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by a unanimous Supreme Court, opinion by Justice Johnson, in 1821. The Bello 
Corrunes was a Spanish ship, captured in 1818 by an American sailing under 
commission issued by the authorities of Buenos Ayres in a ship that had been 
fitted out in the United States in violation of the Neutrality Act of1794.193 It ran 
aground on Block Island, at the Eastern end of Long Island Sound, as a group of 
its original crew seized control back from the American licensee of Buenos 
Ayres. The claimants in an Admiralty proceeding thus were the original Spanish 
owners, on the argument that the capture was "piracy" because the authorities 
in Buenos Ayres had no legal power to issue a commission; the American 
licensee, on the basis of his capture of the vessel; and the group of original 
crewmembers, who claimed compensation as salvors for the original owners by 
virtue of their recapture of the ship from "pirates" just before she ran aground. 
The learned counsel before the Supreme Court included Daniel Webster and 
Henry Wheaton for the Spanish owners and the "salvors" respectively, both 
arguing the original seizure to have been "piracy" under article 14 of Pinckney , s 
Treaty.l94 The decision was for the Spanish owners not on the ground of the 
intervening capture having been "piracy," but on the ground of the American 
captor having violated article 14 of the Treaty and the implementing statute of 
14 June 1797,195 and the salvors not having shown that they truly intended to 
return the vessel to its Spanish owners rather than keep it for themselves.196 
Johnson indicated that the Treaty deeming to be "piracy" any American 
privateering against Spain under license from any "Prince or State" with which 
Spain shall be at war was problematical because Spain refused to consider its 
troubles with Buenos Ayres to amount to "war," or Buenos Ayres to be the 
government of a "state." But, he said, whatever the problems in punishing these 
acts as "piracy," they are clearly prohibited "and intended to be stamped with 
the character of piracy. "197 
Meantime, as to the relationship between reality and legal labels, in the 
1820 case of the josefa Segunda198 the Supreme Court reiterated in even stronger 
terms the approach taken by Marshall in U.S. v. Palmer et al. The josefa 
Segunda, suspected of preparing to violate American laws regarding the slave 
trade, was taken into an American port. Rival claimants for the vessel, in 
addition to its captors, were its original Spanish owners and its immediate 
possessors, who were the prize crew put aboard by a Venezuelan privateer. 
To defeat the claim of these last, an argument was made that the Venezuelan 
capturing vessel, the General Arismendi, was a "pirate" because the licensing 
Venezuelan authorities had not been "recognized" by either Spain or the 
United States as a government; that there was no "recognized" state of war 
between Spain and any local authorities in Venezuela, and that even if all of 
this were not so, the josefa Segunda had never been formally taken before a 
Venezuelan or any other prize court and therefore the legal Spanish title had 
never been divested. Justice Henry Livingston for the Supreme Court brushed 
aside all these formal legal arguments: 
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Although not acknowledged by our government as an independent nation, it is well 
known that open war exists between them [the Venezuelan local claimants to authority] 
and his Catholic Majesty, in which the United States maintains strict neutrality. In this 
state of things, this Court cannot but respect the belligerent rights of both parties; and 
does not treat as pirates, the cruizers of either, so long as they act under, and within the 
scope of their respective commissions.199 
The lack of actual condemnation before a prize court was considered 
irrelevant because "a condemnation in a Prize Court of Venezuela was 
inevitable."200 This was judicial naturalism with a vengeance. "War" was 
considered a legally significant "fact," not a legal status. American 
"neutrality" appears also to have been treated as a "fact" despite the 
appearance of status language. The reference to both the facts of war and of 
American neutrality is immediately followed with a reference to "this state 
of things" compelling legal results, the respect for the "belligerent rights of 
both parties." If this was not a judicial "recognition" of the status of the 
Venezuelan authorities as a "party" to a legal "war," it is hard to see what 
would have been. It differs from a declaration by the Executive branch of the 
American government only in that it is legally valid for the particular case 
alone, not necessarily for other purposes or other cases. The case also shows 
the decreasing importance of the forms of the law, the Prize court 
proceedings, to the "naturalist" jurist. Until this time, the American capture 
of the Josefa Segunda from a privateer prior to the legal title in the vessel and its 
cargo being changed by some national Prize court would have had the same 
legal result as a rescue from "pirates": Return of the vessel and cargo to its 
legal owners and payment by them of" salvage" to the recaptors. Instead, the 
result in the Josefa Segunda in practical terms was the defeat of Spanish title (by 
presuming the result of a Venezuelan prize court-and presuming sufficient 
legal status in the authorities of Venezuela to hold one) and the defeat of the 
title claimed by the General Arismendi's owners and company by virtue of the 
violation of the American anti-slave-trade laws in the territorial waters of 
the United States, and thus the full value of the vessel and its cargo to the 
American captors and government under those laws. Presumably this is the 
same result the political branches of the American government would have 
wanted to reach by the discretionary application oflegallabels in a positivist 
mode, and, by restricting the labels to the particular case, avoided 
international political complications that handling by the executive branch 
alone in diplomatic correspondence and administrative action would have 
entailed. And yet, it seems apparent that to a large degree the Supreme Court 
was exercising a political discretion, attaching labels not, perhaps, for strictly 
policy reasons, as a self-conscious executive might have done, but finding 
colorable reasons in a naturalist mode for attaching the labels most likely to be 
welcomed by the administration of President Madison. Presumably they are 
the same reasons that a positivist would have chosen in diplomatic 
correspondence with Spain, although in that case tempered by apprehensions 
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of reciprocal treatment by Spanish authorities with regard to American 
vessels captured by America's enemies and not yet formally condemned, and 
perhaps also by concern lest the Spanish authorities for their own policy 
reasons "recognize" the international legal capacity of various American 
Indian tribes or other groups which it was in the United States political 
interest to suppress without reference to the rules of international law. 
The Supreme Court itself did not maintain this exaggerated role in the 
discretionary business of attaching legal labels relating to international 
affairs. Once the political branches had "recognized" the war of indepen-
dence between Spain and its American colonies, and proclaimed United 
States neutrality, the Court could skip back to its more comfortable role as a 
judicial branch of government concerned with applying American municipal 
law and only such international law as American municipal law required it to 
apply. The case marking this retreat was the Santissima Trinidad and the St. 
Andre.201 Justice Story delivered the Court's unanimous opinion. The case 
involved an American-built ship, the Independencia sold to James (Diego?) 
Chaytor, of originally American, now nuclear, nationality, who held a 
commission from the authorities of Buenos Ayres. Story wrote: 
Buenos Ayres has not yet been acknowledged as a sovereign independent government by 
the executive or legislature of the United States and, therefore, is not entitled to have 
her ships of war recognized by our courts as national ships. We have, in former cases, 
had occasion to express our opinion on this point. The government of the United States 
has recognized the existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has 
avowed a determination to remain neutral between the parties, and to allow to each the 
same rights of ... intercourse. Each party is, therefore, deemed by us a belligerent 
nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war, and entitled to be 
respected in the exercise of those rights.202 
But the fitting out of the Independencia and a companion vessel in the United 
States was a violation of the American Neutrality Act even if not a violation 
of article 14 of Pinckney's Treaty203 and Story argued that the American 
Neutrality Act was but one country's legislation expressing the underlying 
principles of all civilized countries (or, at least, all countries participating in 
the international legal order as conceived by Story) and, therefore, was 
simply part of the "law of nations" as conceived by Blackstone. Thus, while 
rejecting the characterization of Chaytor as a "pirate" under article 14 of 
Pinckney's Treaty, and, by virtue of its public character rejecting the 
characterization of the Independencia as a "pirate" vessel, he held that the 
wrongful fitting out of the vessel in the United States "is a violation of the law 
of nations, as well as of our own municipal laws" and that violation "infects 
the captures subsequently made with the character of torts, and ... requires 
restitution.' '204 
As to the property rights adjudicated by a forei~ prize court, Story and the 
Supreme Court retreated considerably from the glib dismissal of the foreign 
legal process evident in the presumption of condemnation and the giving of 
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current effect to the merely anticipated legal action in the Josefa Segunda. The 
Santissima Trinidad had been captured by the Independencia and, with the consent 
of all parties in the United States, had been sold there with the money 
received replacing the vessel as the object of this Admiralty in rem proceeding. 
During the pendency of the proceeding a Prize court in Buenos Ayres had in 
fact condemned the vessel in absentia. The Supreme Court did not object to the 
action of the Buenos Ayres court, ruling rather surprisingly that a belligerent 
Prize court could legally act when a prize is physically elsewhere, in a neutral 
port. But Story found two reasons why that Prize court action was 
ineffective: (1) the vessel, having already been submitted to an Admiralty 
court, it was no longer in the hands of the captor, so the res essential to an in rem 
action was missing, (2) the property was already in the hands of an American 
court, and the supervening action of a foreign court cannot oust the American 
court of its jurisdiction: "It would be an attempt to exercise a sovereign 
authority over the court having possession of the thing, and take from the 
nation the right of vindicating its own justice and neutrality. "205 The first 
reason seems inconsistent with the reasoning of the court in the Josefa Segunda, 
where the act of the foreign prize court was anticipated and had never 
occurred even during the American proceedings. The second goes to the 
question of jurisdiction, not substance, and it is hard to see why an otherwise 
valid legal act should be denied legal effect as a tp.atter of national honor in an 
Admiralty proceeding whose primary object is to evaluate conflicting claims 
to property rights resting on foreign laws. Title to the vessel was restored to 
its original Spanish owners, thus, although they did not in fact get their ship 
back, they got the money that had replaced it in the action. 
It seems clear that by taking a "naturalist" line, labeling "belligerency," 
and thus subject to the laws of war as they apply between states, the fighting 
between a group seeking governmental authority and a group losing control 
over the territory and population its constitution presumed that it ruled, on 
the basis of "objective" facts rather than policy arguments, the Supreme 
Court had made the label "piracy" irrelevant to questions arising out of the 
acts of the licensees of unrecognized authorities. When the policy-making 
branches of the American government agreed on the basis of its own 
positivist, policy, arguments there was no difficulty. There is no case known 
to have arisen over a conflict of labels between the courts and the policy-
making branches of the American government. 
This evolution was probably helped by an equivalent evolution in England, 
where Sir William Scott in 1819 had come to similar results in similar (but 
very complex) circumstances. A British ship, the Hercules was commissioned 
by Buenos Ayres to cruise against Spanish shipping. It had sold various 
captured vessels without first submitting them to Prize court hearings in 
Buenos Ayres. It was arrested by a British naval vessel for a claimed breach of 
the revenue laws of Barbados and taken to the British Admiralty court in 
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Antigua for adjudication among the captor seeking his share under a British 
statute regarding naval captures to enforce revenue laws, the British owner 
of the cargo, the British captain of the vessel for the vessel itself, the Spanish 
Ambassador for the Spanish crown and owners of vessels and cargo plundered 
by the Hercules, and a local attorney for the particular Spanish owners of 
identifiable cargo plundered from a particular vessel. In the Antigua court, 
the Navy captain won. The case was taken to England on appeal. Sir William 
Scott found the Antigua Admiralty court had lacked jurisdiction under 
British law to hear a case involving a breach of Barbados revenue laws, and 
held for the British owner of the vessel and the bulk of its cargo. Immediately, 
the Spanish Ambassador and the other Spanish claimants appealed again 
claiming the Hercules to have been a "pirate" vessel when it captured their 
property on the ground that the authorities in Buenos Ayres had no legal 
power to issue a valid commission. 
Scott's solution was to eliminate the law of "piracy" from the case and 
restrict that law to the "criminal law" context which was only part of its 
origin in English municipal law. The international law aspects of the case he 
held to be questions of property law only, on which he proposed to hold 
further hearings. As a result of this decision, the report notes, "Some further 
proceedings were had ... , but owing to a compromise which took place 
between the several parties, it did not again come on for discussion. "206 In 
reaching this result, Scott had some pertinent things to say about the law of 
"piracy" as conceived in England at this time: 
It is to be observed, likewise, that piracy has long ceased to be practiced in any 
considerable extent. There is said to be a fashion in crimes; and piracy, at least in its 
simple and original form, is no longer in vogue. Time was when the spirit of 
buccaneering approached in some degree to the spirit of chivalry in point of adventure; 
and the practice of it, particularly with respect to the commerce and navigation and 
coasts of the Spanish American colonies, was thought to reflect no dishonour upon 
distinguished Englishmen who engaged in it .... But whether the numerous fleets, 
which in later times have been maintained by the European States, or the prevalence of 
juster notions, and gentler manners, and commercial habits, have cleared the ocean of 
this nuisance, the fact is certain, that the records of our own criminal Courts shew that 
piracy is become a crime of rare occurrence, hardly visible for above a century past, but 
in the solitary instances of a few obscure individuals. Pirates, in the ancient meaning of 
the term, are literally rari nantes on the high seas .... Now, piracy is certainly not 
considered as a felony at the common law ... [I] will hear the case for restitution.207 
Thus, by relegating "piracy" to the strict criminal law context and 
denying Common Law jurisdiction (by virtue of the Act of 1536, which Sir 
William Scott regarded as excluding the Common Law courts and the normal 
Admiralty courts from the cases of alleged "piracy" as crime), and viewing 
the Admiralty courts as strict property courts in the same way as had been 
done by Sir Julius Caesar some 150 years earlier,20s the legal efficacy of the 
word even to justify the preservation of property rights of the victims of 
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illegal captures at sea was eliminated. His reasoning does not depend on the 
lack of animo furandi, but on lack of jurisdiction and the fundamental 
irrelevancy of the concept to the kind of case resulting from captures undeJ: 
licenses issued by doubtful public authorities. 
A similar approach was taken in 1826 by the American Supreme Court, 
again unanimously and again under an opinion written by Justice Story, when 
an American naval claimant sought to justify the taking of a Portuguese 
merchant ship on the ground of its "piratical" behavior. While Story was 
much less certain than Scott of the total obsolescence of the law of "piracy, " 
he restricted the notion in the case of a foreign vessel, flying a flag to which it 
is authorized, to when that vessel was engaged in "a private unauthorized 
war." Under this opinion, the Supreme Court decreed the return of the vessel 
to its Portuguese owners, but released the American Navy captain from 
liability for damages resulting from his wrongful, but reasonable, taking of 
the vessel. 209 
The same result followed a year later with an accompanying rationale 
apparently even more strongly influenced by Scott's reasoning in the Hercules. 
The Palmyra, sailing under a Spanish commission, had been taken on the high 
seas by an American warship in 1822 after minor resistance. The Palmyra's 
commission had been issued to a different vessel under a different commander, 
and had expired; it had then been renewed and issued to the Palmyra by a 
minor Spanish official of undocumented authority. Acting under that 
commission, ~he Palmyra had plundered two French vessels, the Coquette and 
the Jeune Eugenie. The American captor, Lieutenant Gregory, brought the 
Palmyra in for adjudication, and the owners of the Palmyra sued him for 
damages, claiming American interference with her voyage was unjustified 
and the case, since it did not involve any American legal interest, beyond the 
jurisdiction of American courts. Justice Story delivered the Supreme Court's 
opinion. As to substance, the court held that the burden on the captor to prove 
the Palmyra was a "pirate" vessel had not been borne, thus the acquittal of the 
vessel and its crew was confirmed; mere irregularity in the ship's papers and 
her excessive action against the two French vessels did not constitute 
"piracy. "210 But the statute under which Lieutenant Gregory acted 
authorized the President to instruct the commanders of American public 
vessels to take only vessels with armed crews "which shall have attempted or 
committed any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation or 
seizure. "211 This use of "piratical" as an adjective .caused obvious problems, 
and Story pointed out that the case was not a criminal case, but an in rem 
Admiralty proceeding in which the actual charge of "piracy" was not being 
determined. The question thus resolved itself not to an issue of the law of 
nations or the precise definition of" piracy, " but to a narrower question of the 
intent of the Congress expressed in the statute. As to the international law , 
Story concluded that "whatever may be the irregularities, ... such 
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commission ... ought, in the courts of neutral nations, to be held a complete 
protection against the imputation of general piracy." As to the in rem 
proceeding, he went on, "[TJaking the circumstances together, the Court 
thinks that they presented, prima jacie, a case of piratical aggression ... within 
the acts of Congress, open to explanation indeed ... ; Lieutenant Gregory, 
then, was justifiable in sending her in for adjudication, and has been guilty of 
no wrong calling for compensation. "212 
Implicit in this holding was an extension of American jurisdiction to 
foreign vessels suspected of "robbery at sea" against other foreign vessels 
with no clear American interest in the transaction. Story's conception of 
universal criminal law jurisdiction over "pirates" seems to have been adopted 
by the Court as a whole. But again, the case was not presented squarely; it was 
not in fact a criminal prosecution and the Palmyra was restored to its owners 
despite the doubtful commission and the firmly stated view of the Court that 
"Her [the Palmyra's J exercise of the right of search on these [French J vessels 
was irregular and unjustifiable. "213 Thus, the case can be interpreted to stand 
for something very close to the opposite of what Story wanted. The assertion 
of universal American police jurisdiction was not necessary for the result and 
stands as mere dicta; and the need for some clear public authority to license 
interference with navigation on the high sea was reduced to a mere need for 
the semblance of such authority which a "neutral nation" could not properly 
question. A relationship of belligerency between the flag state of the 
"privateer" (or "pirate ") and the victim would come close to making moot 
the question of licenses. Story preserved the possibility that a "privateer" 
might become a "pirate" even if acting only against vessels of an authority at 
war with the authority issuing the commission, but the likelihood seems 
remote of ever being able to present a convincing case on the point, and none 
has been found. 
On this last point, the trend of the law seems to have been against Story and 
his attempt to extend the Supreme Court's assertions beyond the cases before 
it to cover general policingjurisdiction. In 1829 a prosecution of an individual 
of possible American nationality for "piracy against a French vessel on the 
high seas" (apparently all the acts took place within a single vessel) resulted in 
an acquittal "for want of jurisdiction"214 under a charge that made the 
nationality of the defendant the key to jurisdiction under the acts of 1790, 
section 8, and 1820, section 3. Dallas, the prosecuting attorney for the United 
States, agreed that there was no case against the defendant under a charge of 
"piracy by the law of nations" because he was "indicted as a citizen of the 
United States, for violating the laws of the United States." The District 
Judge, Hopkinson, interpreted U.S. v. Palmer et al. to exclude from the scope 
of the 1790 Act a crime by a foreigner on board a foreign vessel, and 
interpreted U.S. v. Klintock to be consistent with that approach. The 
extension of the statute to cover vessels of no flag in U.S. v. Holmes he 
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construed as limited to that; it did not extend the act to cover vessels of a 
known foreign flag. While the act of 1819 extended American jurisdiction to 
cases of "piracy" at intemationallaw, Hopkinson argued the Congress "had 
felt the force of the reasoning in Palmer's case; and may have doubted the 
policy or propriety of extending their penal law beyond their own vessels, 
leaving it to other nations to do the same with theirs. "215 He construed the 
later acts of Congress to conform to this view, and concluded that acts wholly 
within a foreign vessel "sailing under the flag of a foreign state, whose 
authority is acknowledged, is not piracy within the true intent and meaning of 
that [1820] act, and this court hath no cognizance to hear, try, determine and 
punish the same. "216 
Story had a final chance to try to establish the jurisdiction of United States 
courts over foreigners acting solely against foreign shipping, and to expand 
the definition of "piracy" to include more than robbery and murder across 
jurisdictional lines at sea in 1844. The Brig Malek Adhelbound on a commercial 
voyage from New York to California apparently attacked at least five other 
vessels on the high sea. Two of the victims were British-owned and one 
Portuguese (two were American-owned), but actual depredation and plunder 
was alleged only with regard to the Portuguese vessel; the others were 
apparently fired on only to sink them or harass them. Although the Malek 
Adhel was in fact American-owned, and thus there need have been no doubt 
regarding jurisdiction, Story construed the Act of1819 as extended in 1820, 
second section, which authorizes American warships to seize "any vessel or 
boat ... which shall have committed any piratical aggression ... upon any 
other vessel" to apply without regard to any issues of standing: 
The policy as well as the words of the act equally extend to all armed vessels which 
commit the unlawful acts specified therein.217 
As to the substance of the offense, Story interpreted the adjective "piratical" 
to include: 
The class of offences which pirates are in the habit of perpetrating, whether they do it 
for purposes of plunder, or for purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton abuse of 
power ..•• If he willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any 
other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much a piratical 
aggression, in the sense of the law of nations, and of the act of Congress, as ifhe did it 
solely and exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causa.21S 
Of course, the case did not involve "piracy" as such; it was not a criminal 
proceeding but an in rem proceeding. The lower court decree condemning the 
vessel as a punishment authorized by the statute, but releasing its cargo to the 
innocent owners, was affirmed. The funds received from sale of the vessel 
were used to indemnify the captors for their costs and charges; it appears that 
the victims suffered no provable losses other than to their dignity.219 
The question of the validity of a commission issued by an unrecognized 
authority arose again most poignantly when Texas declared its independence 
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of Mexico. In 1836 an armed schooner, the Invincible, captured an American 
brig, Pocket, bound for a Mexican port within the territory claimed by Texas. 
The President (Andrew Jackson) asked Attorney General Benjamin Butler 
whether the Invincible was a "pirate." His answer was that under Section 9 of 
the Act of 1790 Americans involved in the action of the Invincible would be 
considered "pirates" by the law of the United States220 (whatever their 
situation under international law), but that the situation was different for 
Texans (or rebelling Mexicans, as they legally were): 
Where a civil war breaks out in a foreign nation, and part of such nation erect a distinct 
and separate government, and the United States, though they do not acknowledge the 
independence of the new government, do yet recognize the existence of a civil war, our 
courts have uniformly regarded each party as a belligerent nation, in regard to acts done 
jure belli. Such may be unlawful, when measured by the laws of nations or by treaty 
stipulations; the individuals concerned in them may be treated as trespassers, and the 
nation to which they belong may be held responsible by the United States; but the parties 
concerned are not treated as pirates.221 
This approach, relieving the privateers of the unrecognized government of 
Texas of the legal results of "piracy" on the basis of their deriving their 
authority to act from the laws of war and their adherence to a public 
organization engaged in that belligerency, was asserted to be valid despite the 
fact that the interference with American shipping "would seem to be an 
infraction of the treaty made in 1831 between the United States and the 
United Mexican States, (of which Texas was then a constitutent [sic] part), 
and there may be other reasons for doubting its legality as an act done in the 
right of war. "222 The point was that once the relations between Mexico and 
the Texas authorities were considered "belligerent," the law of war applied 
and "piracy" was incompatible with belligerency as long as the "pirates" 
were acting, not necessarily in full conformity with that law, but within that 
system of law. They might be "war criminals," but not "pirates." That the 
law of war applied between Mexico and the authorities of Texas was 
determined by Attorney General Butler as a matter of strict positivist logic: 
The existence of a civil war between the people of Texas and the authorities and the 
people of the other Mexican States, was recognized by the President of the United States 
at an early day in the month of November last. Official notice of this fact, and of the 
President's intention to preserve the neutrality of the United States, was soon after 
given to the Mexican government.223 
Attorney General Butler thus did not examine whether the facts viewed 
objectively justified this American classification of relations between Texas 
and the rest of Mexico, but accepted the classifications given by the policy 
officers of a political branch, the executive, as the basis for his legal analysis. 
This approach, relying on policy officers for the basic classification system, 
and then interpreting the law of war to exclude "piracy" even for acts done in 
excess of any commission or of the power of the belligerent to issue a 
commission restricts the scope of the law of "piracy" essentially to two areas: 
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(1) the municipal law relating to robbery within the jurisdiction of the 
municipal Admiralty courts, and (2) whatever might remain of the original 
Roman and Mediterranean conception of "piracy" as the behavior of states or 
belligerents defined by a positive law system as outside the group governed 
directly by the system. 
This approach was not restricted to American executive branch officials. It 
was taken by an Italian Umpire in 1863 rejecting a claim by American 
investors (chiefly Cornelius Vanderbilt) against Costa Rica arising out of the 
war of 1856 between that country and Nicaragua in which American 
property in Nicaragua had been destroyed. In 1854 the government of 
Nicaragua had been overthrown by adventurers led by William Walker, an 
American. In the words of CDR Joseph Bertinatti, the Umpire in the later 
arbitration, "The new government of Nicaragua ... , though illegitimate and 
piratical in its origin, ... was in fact ... the only government of that state. "224 
Costa Rica intervened in 1856 to oust the "Rivas-Walker" government of 
Nicaragua. For reasons that are not clear, the American investors then seem 
to have convinced the Rivas-Walker Government to "nationalize" their 
property in Nicaragua and hand it over to a second private company 
organized under Nicaraguan law by the same investors. The property was 
eventually destroyed by Costa Rica in the war. The American investors' legal 
theory in the arbitration appears to have been that the Rivas-Walker 
government was merely a group of "pirates," therefore incapable of 
changing property rights; that the destruction of the Americans' property by 
Costa Rica was therefore the destruction not of property legitimately used by 
the Rivas-Walker people or those legal persons deriving title from them, but 
of "neutral" property not legitimately the object of belligerent operations. 
This attempt to manipulate the legal labels to insulate American investors 
from the consequence of their own political activities in Nicaragua was 
rejected by CDR Bertinatti on several grounds. One, that the Corporation 
created under Nicaraguan law was Nicaraguan, and that the law of claims did 
not permit foreign investors to assert the neutrality of their indirectly owned 
property, is irrelevant to the current study.225 Another, that "the fact, which 
is more eloquent than words, shows that it was a public war and a regular war, 
fought as such on both sides according to the civilized usages of warfare" and 
that during the conflict the United States "recognized the Rivas-Walker 
government, not only as belligerent, but also as the regular government of 
Nicaragua" can be seen to defeat the use of the concept of "piracy" as a basis 
for denying governmental competence to a de facto authority for the purpose 
of private claims.226 The importance of this approach will become apparent in 
the next section. 
The United States position regarding the use of the legal word and concept 
of "piracy" in cases of political rising, based probably on the Revolutionary 
war experience, reviewed above was absolutely to deny the propriety of the 
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word. In 1838 Canadian and American raiders based in New York State 
skirmished with British forces in Canada. In the correspondence that 
followed, Mr. H.S. Fox, the British Minister in Washington, referred to 
British-Canadians "defending the British territory from the unprovoked 
attack of a band of British rebels and American pirates. "227 Daniel Webster, 
the American Secretary of State, replied: 
But whether the revolt be recent or long continued, they who join those concerned in it, 
whatever may be their offence against their own country, or however they may be 
treated, if taken with arms in their hands in the territory of the Government, against 
which the standard of revolt is raised, cannot be denominated pirates, without departing 
from all ordinary use oflanguage in the definition of offences.228 
At the time, Great Britain in no way had "recognized" any degree of 
belligerent status in the Canadian rebels, and the United States was entirely at 
peace with Great Britain, referring to the problems in Canada as "civil 
commotions," not "war" or "belligerency."229 
Civil War of 1861-1865. The entire question of the validity of a commission 
issued by an unrecognized authority, and the possibility that the legal results 
of "piracy" could be attached to an attack under color of such a commission, 
even if not animo furandi, but instead animo belligerandi, arose in the United States 
during the Civil War of1861-1865, and the entire naturalist-positivist debate 
broke out again. This time, there was an ironic twist in that the arguments 
that were persuasive to the slavery-hating Story, who felt until the cases and 
his work on conflict oflaws theory convinced him otherwise, that the natural 
law of property gave universal scope for American action against "piracy," 
now became attractive to the slavery-justifying Confederate States and their 
sympathizers. From their point of view, the actual hostilities occurring 
between the states of the southern Confederacy on the one hand and the rump 
of the Union on the other should determine legal labels regardless of the 
policy reasons that might be advanced in the north for preferring a different 
set oflabels. Their "naturalist" argument was that the substantive law arises 
from facts and traditions that judges are able by training and empowered by 
Constitutional law and tradition to fmd and declare; that under that law, the 
actions of southern privateers and navy commissioners were public, not animo 
furandi, and fit the labels involved in a legal status of belligerency; they were 
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war if caught; their legal captures could 
convey valid title after Prize court proceedings. To the unionist judges, the 
political branches of the American government had the legal power to 
determine the classifications of events, and the courts were bound to apply the 
law growing out of those classifications. If the Confederate authorities were 
unrecognized, their commissions were simply pieces of paper authorizing 
nothing; depredations done under color of those commissions could thus be 
classified "piracy." 
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The question arose when President Lincoln declared a blockade of the 
Southern states' ports on 19 and 27 April 1861.230 The Proclamations of19 and 
27 April said respectively: 
Now, therefore, I ... deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within 
the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the law of 
nations, 
and 
[A]n efficient blockade of the ports of those States will also be established.231 
The Congress did not act until 13 July 1861, when it "empowered" the 
President "to close the port or ports of entry" in any customs collection 
district of the United States232 and "to declare that the inhabitants of[ a] State, 
or any section or part thereof, ... are in a state of insurrection against the 
United States" and that commerce unlicensed by him "shall cease and be 
unlawful so long as such condition of hostility shall continue. "233 The issues 
were the Constitutional power of the President to impose a blockade prior to 
the empowering legislation by the Congress, whether the Presidential 
or Congressional actions amounted to a "Declaration of War" within the 
sense of the Constitution and internationallaw,234 and whether Confederate 
States blockade runners and bearers of Confederate letters of marque were 
"pirates" or otherwise violators of international law as well as being 
criminals under the municipal law of the United States.235 
The Supreme Court was deeply split, not on sectional lines, but on lines of 
legal theory. The "naturalist" position was taken by the 5-4 majority in The 
Prize Cases.236 Judge Robert Grier of Pennsylvania wrote the majority 
opinion,237 upholding the legal effect of the "blockade" on the ground that: 
A blockade de facto actually existed, and was formally declared and notified by the 
President .... Itis not the less a civil war, with belligerent parties in hostile array, butit 
may be called an 'insurrection' by one side, and the insurgents be considered as rebels or 
traitors.233 
Support for this position was found in the American treatment oflicensees 
of the unrecognized governments of rebelling Spanish colonies during the 
1810s and 1820s.239 Mocking the practical implications of the "positivist" 
position by which all Confederate organization was a mere criminal 
conspiracy against the laws of the Union, Grier pointed out the absurdity of 
considering soldiers of the United States in the field to be "executioners" 
chasing down those accused of "treason." Reciprocally, he pointed out that 
the Confederates claimed belligerent rights at sea, and could not be heard 
now to deny the belligerent rights of the Union as "unconstitutional!!!" [SiC].240 
The result of this analysis was the conclusion that the status of the 
unrecognized belligerent need not be determined, but that "the belligerent 
party who claims to be sovereign may exercise both belligerent and sovereign 
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rights. "241 Thus the "naturalist" approach was interpreted to allow 
"belligerent rights" to the Union without limiting the "sovereign rights" of 
the Union. The approach would give the same "belligerent rights" to the 
Confederacy, but not necessarily "sovereign rights"; to compose the 
Supreme Court majority it was not necessary to go that far and actually hold 
that the Confederacy had "belligerent rights" equivalent to those of the 
Union.242 The result of this approach in practice was that a Virginia vessel 
whose captain had not known the war had begun was condemned (The Brig 
Amy Warwick); another Virginia vessel outward bound with cargo owned by 
northerners was condemned but her cargo restored as not" enemy property" 
(The Schooner Crenshaw); a British vessel was condemned on the ground that 
she had violated the blockade order after notice, as a mere business risk-to 
finish loading (The Barque Hiawatha); and a Mexican vessel was condemned 
for knowingly entering a blockaded port (Biloxi, Mississippi) without a 
permit {The Schooner Brilliante).243 
The dissent by Justice Samuel Nelson of New York244 took a straight 
"positivist" line. Lincoln's declaration was not classifiable as a blockade jure 
belli because there was no legal status of war, no Declaration of War by the 
Congress, when he made his proclamations. They represented more a 
municipal law closure of ports "in the nature of a blockade." The Act of 
Congress on 13 July 1861 was legally sufficient to serve as a Declaration of 
War under the Constitution, he said, but came too late to endow Lincoln's 
proclamations with legal effect against the four vessels before the court. 
According to the dissenters, the two vessels owned by "neutrals" should have 
been released to their owners because a strictly internal proclamation with 
strictly territorial application was not enough to bring the law of belligerent 
prize into play. With regard to the ships owned by Americans from the 
Confederate States, Nelson and the others in the narrow minority would have 
released them on the ground that the President's proclamations exceeded his 
Constitutional powers and were a legal nullity in the United States.245 
This split oflegal thinking is evident throughout the American Civil War. 
On 3 July 1861, after President Lincoln's Proclamations asserted some 
belligerent rights in the Union and before the ambiguous legislation that the 
Supreme Court majority of one could regard as equivalent to a Declaration of 
War for the purpose of authorizing the President to begin a blockade 
effective against both Americans and neutral foreigners, the Confederate 
warship Sumter burned a Union merchant vessel, the Golden Rocket, triggering 
a series of insurance claims. The policy covered hazards of "the sea, fire, 
enemies, pirates, assailing thieves, restraints and detainments of all kings, 
princes or people, of what nation or quality soever, barratry by the 
master . . . " and some other risks, but an additional provision amended all 
that by making an exception to coverage if the vessel were subject to 
"capture, seizure or detention ... "regardless of the other stipulations of 
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the policy. The question was whether the burning by Confederate forces at a 
time the Union authorities did not even unambiguously concede a status of 
belligerency, much less a legal power in any Confederate authorities to 
license depredations under the laws of war against Union shipping, fell within 
the exception. In Dole v. New England Mutual Marine Ins. CO.246 a 
Massachusetts court held that the term "capture" as used in the policy could 
describe the taking by the commissioner of one side in "an actually existing 
state of war between it and the government of the United States," finding 
support for this naturalist conclusion in the fact that the authority of the 
Confederate leadership to conduct a war according to the international rules 
had been recognized by "two of the leading nations of Europe" {Great 
Britain and France}. As an objective matter, therefore, it would be possible 
for a jury to conclude that the" capture" exception applied, and the case was 
ordered to tria1.247 The possibility that this way of handling the situation 
might lead to an inconsistency between the classifications of the judicial 
branch of the American Government and the other two branches of that 
government did not seem to be considered seriously, apparently because the 
case was viewed as a matter simply of interpreting an insurance contract, not 
ofinterpreting the foreign relations or legal status of the United States against 
the Confederate States, neither of whose public authorities in any guise was a 
party to the suit. 
A similar result came out of another case arising out of the same incident in 
which a different insurance company was sued in Maine. In Dole v. 
Merchants' Mutual Ins. CO.248 the Court concluded that the most extreme 
"positivist" position did nothing to require the Confederate commissioner to 
be classified a "pirate," although that classification was not ruled out: 
\Var is an existing fact, and not a legislative decree. Congress alone may have power to 
'declare' it beforehand, and thus cause or commence it. But it may be initiated by other 
nations, or by traitors; and then it exists, whether there is any declaration of it or not .... 
But in a civil war, those who prosecute hostilities against the established government are 
also traitors. And their acts are robbery or murder on the land, or piracy on the sea. 
[With regard to the burning of the Golden Rocket], such a felonious and forcible taking on 
the high seas was piratical and belligerent, and in either case was a capture and a seizure, 
within the terms of the warranty [emphasis sic ].249 
The fact that the actions of the political branches of government were 
ambiguous, indicating differing views as to the legal relations that applied 
between the Union and the Confederacy in the minds of all concerned, was 
bluntly recognized in another case arising out of the maritime depredations of 
a Confederate raider, the Jeff Davis. In Fifield V. Insurance Co. of State of 
Pennsylvania,250 Judge Woodward wrote: 
I suppose that any government, however violent and wrongful its origin, which is in the 
actual exercise of sovereignty over a territory and people large enough for a nation, 
must be considered as a government de facto.25! 
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He then reviewed the two views of secession that had split the lawyers of the 
political arms of government and concluded that: 
[I]t would be very difficult so to generalize the various, discrepant, and sometimes 
inconsistent measures that have been taken against the rebellion as to enable us to 
declare whether the President and Congress regard the seceded states within or without 
the Union.252 
The instant case presented a perfect example, in that the crew of the jeff Davis 
had already been convicted of "piracy" by the judiciary, but the President, 
"after the conviction of the crew of the jeff Davis for piracy ... interposed 
and restored them to the authorities of the Confederate States." He did not 
pardon them; "he treated them as public enemies, and thus, . . . recognized 
the belligerent rights of the power that sent them forth. . . . "253 The court 
concluded that the capture was "belligerent" and not "piracy," applying the 
labeling system it construed out of the actions of a policy-making branch of 
government overruling the judiciary in the very fact situation before the 
court.254 
President Lincoln's exchange of the convicted "pirates" in the case of the 
jeff Davis255 does not stand alone. Under instructions from Judges Grier and 
Cadwalader in a case in Pennsylvania in 1862, convictions were obtained on a 
"positivist" charge of "piracy" against a Confederate raider named Smith 
and others. Under an agreement between the two judges and the prosecuting 
authorities, the prisoners were not sentenced but were transferred to military 
control as prisoners of war. 256 A Confederate adventurer named Burley (or 
Burleigh) was extradited from Canada to the United States in 1864 under the 
"piracy" provision of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, but Judge Fitch of 
Ohio at the trial held that his acts were "belligerent" and not "piracy" 
because lacking "animum furandi. "257 
While the Prize Cases enabled the Union forces to institute and enforce a 
blockade of Confederate ports against neutral vessels, and state court judges 
of varying persuasions were able to vent their frustrations against the 
Confederate authorities in harsh words without actually doing violence to the 
apparent intentions of the innocent parties whose contracts were before the 
courts for interpretation, Federal District court judges were facing the same 
difficulties on the lower levels. Two cases in 1861 will illustrate the confusion. 
In Massachusetts, District Court Judge Sprague charged a Grand Jury with 
regard to the Confederate seamen whose separate cases were to be presented: 
If war is actually levied, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from 
the scene and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy are to be considered as traitors.2!~ 
He then went on to define "pirates:" 
Pirates are highwaymen of the sea, and all civilized nations have a common interest, and 
are under a moral obligation, to arrest and suppress them; and the constitu-
tion ... enables the United States to perform this duty, as one of the family of nations. 
Pirates are called and recognized as enemies. They carry on war, but it is not natural 
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war; and they are not entitled to the benefit of the usages of modern civilized 
international war. There being no government with which a treaty can be made, or 
which can be recognized as responsible for the acts of individuals, the individuals 
themselves are held amenable to criminal justice, and liable to be put to death for the 
suppression of their hostilities. If a number of persons, large or small, associate together, 
and undertake to establish a new government, and assume the character of a nation, and 
as such to issue military commissions, any other nation may, according to its own view 
of policy or duty, either utterly refuse to recognize the existence of such assumed 
government, and treat all who, acting under it, commit aggressions upon the ocean, as 
mere pirates; or each nation may fully recognize such new government; or it may adopt 
any intermediate course between these two extremities,-to some extent, and for some 
purposes, recognize the existence of the new government, while in other respects, and 
for other purposes, it rejects its pretensions to be deemed a nation. Some of the nations of 
the earth, and particularly Great Britain, have taken this intermediate course in relation 
to the self-styled 'Southern Confederacy.' ... She in no degree interferes with the 
manner in which we shall treat either our own citizens or foreigners who may be 
engaged in this conflict, even although [sic] such foreigners be British subjects. She 
leaves us to deal with them as traitors or pirates, according to our own sense of justice 
and policy. Against this her position, we have nothing to urge under the law of nations or 
treaty stipulations.259 
Judge Sprague then went on to review the pertinent Federal legislation of 
the United States, including the "piracy" statutes of 1790, 1820 and 1847,260 
leaving it to the Grand Jury to determine on the particular facts that might be 
presented to it whether any individuals ought to be indicted for "piracy" or 
"treason" under the laws of the Union for their actions in support of the 
Confederacy. It seems plain that the principal result of this charge was to 
reduce the question of the proper legal classification to one of municipal law , 
and that law for the purposes of a Grand Jury empaneled under the 
Constitution was the law of the Union. 
How this approach worked in practice in Massachusetts is not known 
beyond the evidence noted with regard to Fifield v. Insurance Company of 
State of Pennsylvania that some convictions for "piracy" were obtained at 
least in Pennsylvania, and that President Lincoln did not regard himself as 
bound by the rigid view of American classifications adopted by Judge Sprague 
and others, but treated even convicted "pirates" under this view as 
"belligerent enemies" subject to parole and repatriation without "pardon" 
under the laws of the United States. 
A rather less rigid view was taken by the Federal courts in New York. In 
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York Justice 
Nelson charged a petty jury regarding the same Federal statutes and 
continued as follows: 
Now, if it were necessary, on the part of the Government, to bring the crime ... [of the 
Confederate raiders] within the definition of robbery and piracy, as known to the 
common law of nations, there would be great difficulty ... upon the evidence. For that 
shows, if anything, an intent to depredate upon the vessels and property of one nation 
only-the United States-which falls far short of the spirit and intent, as we have seen, 
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that are said to constitute essential elements of the crime. But the robbery charged in this 
case is that which the Act of Congress [of 1820] prescribes as a crime, and may be 
denominated a statute offence, as contra-distinguished from that known to the law of 
nations .... [As to whether there is a legal state of war between the Union and the 
Confederacy, that, according to Judge Nelson was a matter for] the departments of our 
Government that have charge of our foreign relations-the Legislative and Executive 
departments .... [U]ntil those departments have recoguized the existence of the new 
Government, the Courts of the nation cannot.261 
But the precedents of the Spanish colonies in America seemed to Nelson to 
raise confusing issues. The political arms of the United States government had 
not "recognized" any status in the revolted Spanish colonies with legal 
implications until 1822. 
Prior to this recognition, and during the existence of the civil war between Spain and 
her Colonies, it was the declared policy of our Government to treat both parties as 
belligerents ... , equally entitled to the sovereign rights of war as against each other.z62 
Not only was he unable to state where this policy was "declared" prior to 
1822, but it appears that the Act of1822 by which the independent status of the 
former Spanish colonies was "recognized" by the Congress made no 
difference in the courts. He implied that absent recognition there is no change 
in the prior legal relationship, thus that the Confederate raiders could not be 
regarded as authorized by either the law of an unrecognized Confederate 
government or by the international law of war prior to the "recognition" of a 
status of war by the political branches of government. But the facts that had 
resulted in the courts treating the commissioners of the Spanish colonies as 
belligerents as long as their depredations were aimed, within the terms of 
their commissions, solely against Spanish shipping, despite the silence of the 
political branches of the American government, apparently spoke loudly to 
some members of the jury. In U.S. v. Baker and others, "The jury were 
discharged, without being able to agree on a verdict. "263 
British judges had similar problems in classifying the American struggle 
within the system adopted by the political branches of the British government 
to try to reflect facts and policy in a coherent pattern oflaw. In May 1864 the 
United States sought extradition of a group of Confederate raiders who had 
seized an American merchant ship and then claimed asylum in England.264 The 
Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842265 provided for the extradition of those 
accused of "Piracy" in Article X when the offense had been committed 
within the jurisdiction of either party and the person accused of committing it 
were found within the other. The extradition request was denied, but on such 
technical grounds that the suspicion must exist that the British court found 
itselfin a dilemma between the classifications of "piracy" and "belligerency" 
and did not want to face the case squarely. Three judges wrote separate 
opinions for the majority. Judge Crompton pointed out that the question of 
whether the acts of depredation were "piratical" or "belligerent," with 
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evidence that the captured goods were taken for the personal use of the 
accused, and not taken for submission to a Prize court, must be one for a 
jury. Then, instead of holding that there was enough evidence (or not 
enough) to warrant extradition and the submission of the case to an 
Americanjury on a charge of "piracy, "he construed the Treaty and statute 
to refer only to cases which could be tried only in the jurisdiction of the 
requesting state and not in the jurisdiction of the "asylum" state: 
" ... 'committed within the jurisdiction of the United States of America' 
I own, appears to me to mean within the peculiar jurisdiction of the United 
States, and would not be properly used if the common jurisdiction of every 
maritime nation in the world were meant [emphasis sic]." Since all 
maritime nations, in his view, had equal legal powers to try "pirates," the 
"piracy" intended by the W ebster-Ashburton Treaty must mean only 
municipal law "piracy," not "piracy jure gentium." Interpreted this way, 
"piracy" to be extraditable under the terms of the treaty266 must be a crime, 
like murder, punishable independently under the laws of the treaty partners 
but not committed within the prescriptive jurisdiction of both at the same 
time. Crompton thus seemed to presume that the international law 
regarding "standing" did not apply to "piracy," and that the only sort of 
"piracy" that would come within the terms of the treaty was that which 
was analogous to taking a commission from a foreign power to act against 
fellow-citizens as embodied in both British and American statutes.267 Why 
taking a commission from a rebelling "authority" did not satisfy this 
requirement, he did not say. Indeed, his opinion is filled with apparently 
unsupported assertions, such as, "Suppose these persons rose up in mutiny, 
that is no less a piracy against the law of nations, and all other powers have 
the same jurisdiction to punish, although the ship is part of the territory of 
the country to which she belongs. "268 
Judge Shee agreed on the basis of the word "asylum" in the treaty and 
statute that "piracy jure gentium" was not covered and found that the 
American statutes of 1790 and 1819-1820 give a basis for this interpretation by 
distinguishing between "piracy on the high seas," which was "piracy jure 
gentium," and robbery in the waters appertaining to the United States. In his 
opinion, the Tivnan defendants looked like "pirates jure gentium," and not like 
"pirates" under American law because their acts occurred on the high seas. 
Judge Blackburn came to the same conclusion and found a way to avoid 
applying the American statutes of 1790 and 1819-1820 as 'overlapping the 
British statutes to bring the offense within the terms of the treaty and statute: 
But looking at the evidence, what was done by the prisoners is either taking the ship for 
plunder, which would be piracy jure gentium, in which case there is no power in us by 
statute to give them up, or an act of war, and consequently not triable anywhere. For 
although the Confederated States are not recognized as an existing power, yet they are 
as belligerents.269 
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Chief Justice Cockburn dissented, but solely on the ground that in his 
interpretation the treaty and statute provided adequately for the extradition 
of "pirates jure gentium. i, He pointed out that there were ample reasons for 
such a provision, such as the difficulties of trial in one jurisdiction when all the 
witnesses are in the other. As to the relationship of "piratical intent" to 
"belligerent intent, " that, in his view, was a question for the jury. 270 
Reviewing the case as a whole, and considering that something very like 
extradition had in fact taken place in 1834 with regard to "pirates" totally 
independently of the treaty of 1842,271 and that the defendants were not tried 
for "piracy" in England at all, the impression is left that extradition was 
refused because the Britishjudges did not trust American courts to make the 
distinction that Chief Justice Cockburn indicated would be their duty, and 
that the British classification of events during the American Civil War would 
be disregarded by American courts bound by American classifications of the 
same events to deprive the Confederate raiders of the privileges of 
"belligerents" that the British felt they ought to have. The constant 
repetition that the prisoners might well be ''jure gentium pirates" seems either 
an encouragement to the British authorities to try them before a Britishjury 
where the British classifications would have governed, or a politic sop to the 
American authorities requesting extradition, to indicate that the refusal was 
not based on British sympathies with the Confederate cause-whether or not 
that was in fact the case.272 
The more or less definitive American classification of the Civil War did 
not come until thirteen years after the War ended. In Ford v. Surget273 Justice 
Harlan for a unanimous court hit on an ingenious rationale. Although the 
Confederacy as such was legally a nullity as far as the Union was concerned, 
the governments of the individual states of the Confederacy remained 
governments under the American Constitution of1787. The legal acts of the 
Confederacy, therefore, so far as they had legal effect within the individual 
states of the Confederacy, were entitled to all the respect of state laws under 
the Constitution. With regard to the military activities of the Confederate 
army, a "positivist" rationale was found for giving them legal effect: 
To the Confederate army was, however, conceded, in the interest of humanity, and to 
prevent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation, such belligerent rights as belonged 
under the laws of nations to the armies of independent governments engaged in war 
against each other,-that concession placing the soldiers and officers of the rebel army, 
as to all matters directly connected with the mode of prosecuting the war, on the footing 
of those engaged in lawful war, [and exempting] them from liability for acts of 
legitimate warfareP4 
Justice Clifford, in a separate concurring opinion, addressed the situation 
of the Confederate raiders directly. He began by citing the Prize Cases for the 
"naturalist" proposition that " ... when the regular course of justice is 
interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the courts of justice 
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cannot be open, civil war exists, and hostilities may be prosecuted to the 
same extent as in public war. "275 He noted with approval the refusal of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and the Pennsylvania and Maine 
Supreme Courts to hold the Confederate States' commissioners to be 
pirates,276 and concluded: 
Exceptional cases supporting the opposite view may be found in the State reports; but 
they are not in accord with the decisions of this court, and are in direct conflict with 
the great weight of authority derived from [internationallaw].277 
Once again, as when viewing the attempt by Justice Story to preserve his 
universal-jurisdiction, univeral-standing, natural-Iaw-of-property concep-
tion of the international law of "piracy" derived from the coinciding 
municipal laws of the principal European maritime powers, in the face of 
the judicial-deference-to-policy-makers approach taken by the majority of 
the American Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall, there appears 
to have been a Supreme Court Justice restructuring the facts to suit his 
preference for a conceptual approach. Once again, the grand framework 
seemed unable to gain the support of a majority of the Court, although, 
again, not expressly rejected either. Once again, the majority took a view 
of the law based not on underlying structures of justice or evidence of the 
conscience of mankind perceived through a selective citation to the 
opinions of others, but based on amoral policy. The rationale for legal 
classifications seen by the majority was not any perception of underlying 
principle, but a series of decisions by the policy branches of government 
expressed in inconsistent terms and occasionally resulting in inconsistent 
policies that maximized the self-importance of the policy-makers by 
regarding their practices as entirely volitional. The privileges of 
belligerency were "conceded" to the Confederate Army; the reasons for 
that "concession" were political: "the interest of humanity" and "to 
prevent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation." It is clear that if those 
(actors had been regarded as less weighty by the policy-makers, as indeed 
they were from time to time, the "concession" need not as a matter oflaw 
have been granted. This approach, visible with regard to "piracy" since the 
time of Gentili at least, we have called "positivism." And the same limits to 
the discretion of policy-makers are apparent, resting on reciprocity, the 
need to deal with a real world in which legal labels have strange effects if 
not related to some degree with facts, and the pressures from internal and 
external constituencies (in the case of the American Civil War, including 
the views of British statesmen and jurists with whom some contacts were 
economically and politically unavoidable, or avoidable only at exhorbitant 
cost to the Union). 
The American Civil War experience was summed up by Richard Henry 
Dana278 in 1866 when annotating a new edition of Wheaton's classic text:279 
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The following propositions are offered, not as statements of settled law (for most of 
them are not covered by a settled usage of nations, by judicial decisions of present 
authority, or by the agreement of jurists), but as suggestions of principles:-
I. The courts of a State must treat rebellion against the State as a crime .... If the acts are 
depredations on commerce protected by the State, they may be adjudged piracy jure 
gentium by the courts of the State. It is a political and not a legal question. whether the 
right to so treat them shall be exercised. 
II. The fact that the State has actually treated its prisoners as prisoners of war ... , or has 
claimed and exercised the powers and privileges of war as against neutrals, does not 
change the abstract rule oflaw, in the Court .... 
III. If a foreigner knowingly cruises against the commerce of a State under a rebel 
commission, he takes the chance of being treated as a pirate juregentium, or a belligerent. 
It is not the custom for foreign nations to interfere to protect their citizens voluntarily 
aiding a rebellion against a friendly State, if that State makes no discrimination against 
them. 
IV. If a foreigner cruises under a rebel commission, he takes the chance of being treated 
as a pirate or a belligerent by his own nation and all other nations, as well as by that he is 
cruising against. Ifhis own nation does not recognize the belligerency of the rebels, he is, 
by the law of his own country, a pirate. If it does, he is not .... [T]he courts of each 
nation are governed by the consideration whether their own political authorities have, 
or have not, recognized the belligerency. 
V. Where a rebellion has attained such dimensions and organization as to be a State de 
facto, and its acts reach the dimensions of war de facto, and the parent State is obliged to 
exercise powers of war to suppress it, and especially if against neutral interests, it is now 
the custom for the State to yield to the rebellion such belligerent privileges as policy and 
humanity require; and to treat captives as prisoners of war ... Yet this is a matter of 
internal State policy only, changeable at any time.280 
This approach, essentially leaving it to each municipal legal system to 
attach legal words of art as it chooses for policy reasons, and referring 
questions oflegal policy within the American legal system to the arms of the 
government given policy discretion by the American Constitution, amounts 
to a total denial of the existence of any "international law" of "piracy." 
"Piracy jure gentium" seems to have become a conception of each state's 
municipal law to Dana. 
The Later Practice. That this approach was carried over to international 
affairs is evidenced by the incident of the "Haytian insurgents" in 1869, when 
a circular dispatch from the government of Haiti attempted to convince the 
several diplomatic missions accredited to that country that the vessels of 
insurgents who had not been recognized by any other government" can not be 
considered according to the spirit of international maritime law otherwise 
than real pirates. " The reply which the Secretary of State (Hamilton Fish) 
authorized the American Ambassador to Haiti to render said: 
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\Ve mayor may not, at our option, as justice or policy may require, treat them as pirates 
in the absolute and unqualified sense, or we may, as the circumstances of any actual case 
shall suggest, waive the extreme right and recognize, where facts warrant it, an actual 
intent on the part of the individual offenders, not to depredate in a criminal sense and for 
private gain, but to capture and destroy jure belli.281 
The apparently absolute inability of a state to convince other states to 
adopt its evaluation of the facts as warranting the label "piracy" at 
international law, was demonstrated repeatedly, most amusingly (from a 
distance oflOO years) in an incident ofl873 when a German naval commander 
acted on a Spanish proclamation terming some insurgent vessels "pirates" in 
the Mediterranean Sea. He captured one and claimed it as German prize, but 
his own government disavowed the act. Mr. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen as 
Secretary of State in 1883, ten years later, advised the American Ambassador 
in Haiti that the incident demonstrated, if anything, an abuse of the Spanish 
legal power to classify events in Spain. He adopted Justice Nelson's opinion 
from u.S. v. Baker and Others282 without citing it, saying that "The rule is, 
simply, that a 'pirate' is the natural enemy of all men, to be repressed by any, 
and wherever found, while a revolted vessel is the enemy only of the po~er 
against which it acts." He went on: 
While it may be outlawed so far as the outlawing state is concerned, no foreign state is 
bound to respect or execute such outlawry to the extent of treating the vessel as a public 
enemy of mankind. Treason is not piracy, and the attitude of foreign governments 
toward the offender may be negative merely so far as demanded by a proper observance 
of the principle of neutrality.283 
It was even found possible within this general orientation to rationalize the 
recapture of an American vessel from an unrecognized "belligerent" who did 
not seem to be a "pirate" because animated by political and not personal 
goals. That was to treat the captor as if he did not exist! In 1885 some 
American ships near Colombia were seized by an insurrectionary force. Dr. 
Francis Wharton, the Solicitor of the Department of State, advised that the 
vessels could be legally retaken by the United States when on the high seas 
even though the crew cannot be regarded as pirates or as belligerents: 
But, while this is the case, and while it may be conceded that vessels seized by them on 
the high seas are seized under claim of right, yet, vessels belonging to citizens of the 
United States so seized by them may be rescued by our cruisers acting for the owners of 
such vessels in the same way that we could reclaim vessels derelict on the high seas.2M 
A different view at the same time denied the existence of any intermediary 
classification between "pirate" and "belligerent." That view ran into such 
difficulties that it was ultimately disregarded in the case in which it was 
pronounced, and, without acknowledgment or deeper analysis, Wharton's 
approach was applied to get the result he would likely have wanted. The 
Ambrose Light285 was a ship sailing under license of unrecognized authorities 
competing for control of a part of the state of Colombia. It was seized in the 
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Caribbean by an American warship. No Americans were involved in the 
voyage of the Ambrose Light, and no Americans were victims of its activities. 
Judge Brown, of the Federal District Court in the Southern District of New 
York examined a huge selection of Supreme Court cases and publicists' 
writings (nearly all of which are analyzed above) to conclude that there was 
no intermediate legal position between "belligerency" and "piracy," and 
that the decision as to which of these alternative classifications were to be 
applied by American courts depended entirely on "recognition," although 
not necessarily the formal act of recognition by the United States 
government: 
[I]n the absence of recognition by any government whatever, the tribunals of other 
nations must hold such expeditions as this to be technically piratical.286 
On the other hand, he pointed out that this holding, which rested almost 
entirely on cases involving criminal charges under the Acts of 1790 and 
1819-1820, was not related to any criminal charge: 
[T]his is a suit in rem for the condemnation of the vessel only; not a trial upon a criminal 
indictment of the officers and crew .... [C]ondemnation of the vessel as piratical does 
not necessarily imply a criminal liability of her officers or crew.2fl7 
Why the precedents in one area of law should apply in another area in 
which, by his own analysis the impact may be quite different and not 
reversable, is not analyzed. 
The final oddity in the case is. that all of the lengthy analysis was at the end 
discarded when some diplomatic correspondence between the United States 
and the defending government of Colombia was construed by the court to 
imply "recognition" of a status of belligerency favorable to the authorities 
commissioning the Ambrose Light. The vessel was not condemned as 
"piratical, "but was returned to the officers and crew from which it had been 
taken.288 Thus the case cannot represent more than yet another example of a 
learned judge using the opportunity of an interesting fact situation to 
expound a view of the law resting on "natural" principles divorced from 
reality, and finding that the best he could achieve was to show that his 
approach was not necessarily inconsistent with precedent and principle; that 
policy-makers, confronted with reality, had to make adjustments of policy to 
fit that reality, and the result was the creation of a legal pattern that brought 
about a sensible result in disregard of grand theories. 
Summary and Conclusion. This, then, represents the "classical" American 
view of the law of "piracy." It is possible to assert that by the end of the 
nineteenth century, as far as the United States was concerned, the 
international law relating to "piracy," if there were any such law, existed 
only insofar as adopted by the municipal law of the United States. The act of 
adoption was in part statutory, as in the Acts of1790 and 1819-1820, in part. 
through judicial decisions interpreting the references in those Acts to the 
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"law of nations," and in part through diplomatic practice and internal 
practice of the United States during a period of ambiguously "recognized" 
belligerency. The "international law" of "piracy" as thus adopted into 
American law appears to have been in part the mere British municipal law 
relating to "robbery and murder within the jurisdiction of the Admiral" at 
English law, in part American statutes parallel to the English statutes of the 
time of William III terming "piracy" acts of treason or depredations 
analogous to treason undertaken under foreign license (which appear never to 
have been considered part of the "international law" of "piracy, "probably 
because the particular acts involved would not be "crimes" by any other law 
than the law of the sovereign making the legislation), and in part the 
application to the interpretation of criminal statutes of the concept of 
"piracy" applied in England to property cases in which the taker of the 
property was considered to have no claim to it in an in rem action even if no 
criminal action was involved. The multiple confusions were caused in part by 
using a word, "piracy," that had a general pejorative meaning in vernacular 
usage since the early 17th century at least, and at least three distinct legal 
usages. It was compounded by the dilemmas in theory of those who would 
define "international law" to include the "natural law of nations" evidenced 
by parallel statutes in many countries, an approach rejected in practice during 
the early 19th century in connection with the slave trade both in Europe and 
America. It was further compounded by the conception of "naturalist" jurists 
that behind any rule oflaw reflecting moral values, there must lie a "perfect" 
model of which the rule is a mere reflection. This platonic approach to legal 
logic was rejected in practice by the more pragmatic jurists and publicists of 
the Anglo-American system, but remained so deep in the basic conceptions of 
"law" held by such eminent moralists and jurisprudential thinkers as Joseph 
Story, that it was never wholly forgotten or rejected. Rationales were 
developed for retaining this "idealist" conception in case after case in which 
it seemed to be irrelevant at best, morally interesting but legally deceptive 
normally, and obscurantist at worst. In practice, when a non-"idealist" 
statesman or judge was involved, the language of universality and conception 
of a perfect "international law" lying behind the imperfections of national 
legislation drop out with no apparent loss to coherence. 
On the other hand, the dominance of moral-free "positivism" in the 
thinking of the states and pragmatic jurists who have 'governed the actual 
policies of the United States from the earliest days of the Constitution of 1787 
was also limited. Not only was the strain of moralism never entirely 
eradicated from American legal thought, but references to "piracy" were 
found useful in political situations in which the combination of legal results 
and vernacular pejoratives served policy interests. The result in some cases, 
condemnations for "piracy" of political actors later treated as honorable 
political captives, could well look to many as a subservience of true "law" to 
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ill-conceived policy, making the statesmen and jurists appear more hypocrites 
than upholders of the moral standards or practical needs of society. 
In the dynamic and competitive society of the United States, there was no 
way these different approaches could be combined into a single coherent 
jurisprudence; so necessarily, practical politics, thus "positivism," won in 
practice. The "naturalist" dicta of Story and others nonetheless remained for 
later generations to cite, and the jurisprudential battle went on.289 
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legal principle, will, by the Law of Nations, be amenable to the ordinary Tribunals of any or 
every particular State; ... the verification of the fact of Piracy, by sufficient evidence, 
brings them at once within the reach of the first Criminal Tribunal of competent 
authority ... 
6 BFSP 77-85 at p. 79. This argument failed, as Portugal refused to agree and other states, principally 
France, took the position that without Portugal there could be no consensus, and as a matter of positive law 
Portuguese conceptions of the permissability of the slave trade were as persuasive as British conceptions of 
its impermissability. Eventually the British were successful in suppressing the international slave trade not 
by natural law arguments based on the horrors of the practice and natural rights of all humans, but by 
treaties with Portugal, France and the others in which, in return for other things, permission was given to 
Great Britain to stop the trade in each country's vessels. 
111. See ch. H above. 
112. See note 110 above. 
113. U.S. V. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 832, No. 15,551 (D. Mass.) (1822). Story was sitting asjudge 
in the Federal District Court in Massachusetts under the Judicature Act of1789. The quoted language is 
taken from the photographic reproduction of the case in 1 Deak 144 at p. 153. As mentioned in note 69 
above, Story's great work on Conflict of Laws, effectively destroying the logical underpinning of Cicero's 
natural law of nations, jus gentium, as an operative municipal law theory in a world of legally equal and 
independent states, did not appear until 1834. 
114. Appendix H.B below. 
115. U.S. V. Darnaud, 3 Wallace 143 (3rd Circ.) (1855) at p. 160-163. 
116. Id. 178. 
117. See note 110 above. France had insisted at Aix-Ia-Chapelle that whatever the moral evils of the 
slave trade, and whatever the French legislation on the subject, Great Britain could derive therefrom no 
legal right in the international legal order to stop French vessels on the high seas in order to suppress that 
detestable traffic. The French position was upheld by Sir William Scott in the Le Louis, cited above at the 
same note. It also underlay his refusal to consider condemning the Hercules [1819] 165 Eng. Rep. 1511, also in 
2 Dods. 353. See text at notes 206-207 below. 
118. See notes 110 and 117 above. 
119. Quoted in part in note 110 above. 
120. If the evils inherent in slavery could not be shown to be inconsistent with natural law in 1817 or 
1825, and counterargument regarding racial superiority and moral benefits conferred on the slaves could 
block legislation in the United States to abolish the entire practice state by state, or forbid implementation 
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of the Fugitive Slave Law {see The Dred Scott Case, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857», it 
is hardly surprising that doubts exist today as to the sanctity of private property or even the 
impermissability of torture as a matter of human rights law. But this is not the place for further analysis of 
the inability of the legal order to create a consensus through natural law reasoning where the conscience of 
mankind does not in fact agree. 
121. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (I) (c). This formula has its own history, of 
course, but it is not necessary for present purposes to trace it. 
122. The case is cited at note 113 above. The statute is reproduced at Appendix II.B below. 
123. Story, Commentaries, loco cit. note 69 above. 
124. Cited at note 87 above; reproduced at Appendix II.B below. 
125. Set out in the text at note 86 above; reproduced in full at Appendix II.A below. 
126. This would, of course, include the port of London. 
127. This provision is still statutory law in the United States. 18 U.S. Code sec. 1653. Minor amendments 
were made in 1909 and 1948. The entire body of current United States positive law relating to "piracy" in 
the sense discussed in this study is in 18 U.S. Code secs. 1651-1661 and reproduced in Appendix II.C below. 
Those provisions of the Code relating to the President's authority to direct naval activity against "pirates" 
but not defining the term, are in 33 U.S. Code secs. 381-387. 
128. The high seas enforcement jurisdiction of the United States remains vested in the District Court of 
the district of the United States in which the offender is arrested or first landed. 18 U.S. Code sec. 3238. 
129. Consular courts with jurisdiction to settle legal disputes between nationals of the sending state 
alone are a very old Mediterranean institution. The first American consular court was established in 
Algiers by treaty dated 5 September 1795. 1 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions • •• (1910) 1. The treaty of 4 
November 1796 with the Bey of Tripoli permits the establishment of consular 'Jurisdictions" by each party 
"on the same footing with those of the most favoured nations respectively." 2 Malloy, op. cit. 1784 art. IX at 
p. 1786. The treaty of August 1797 (no specific date in August) with the Bey of Tunis provides for the 
respective consuls to judge of "disputes " involving solely persons under his "protection," but if there is an 
offense that crosses nationality lines and involves killing, wounding or striking, the territorial sovereign 
has jurisdiction over the case and the consul a right merely to be present at the trial. Id. 1794, arts. 
XX-XXII at p. 1799. 
130. The first American experience of this was in reaction to activities of "Citizen" Edmond C. Genet, 
the Minister of the revolutionary government of France to the United States 1792-1794. Among the 
exercises of French "sovereignty" in American territory which Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
complained of lind which led to a demand for Genet's recall was the condemnation at his direction by 
French consuls in the United States of British vessels captured by French revolutionary privateers and sold 
by them to American buyers. Jefferson regarded the establishment of Prize Courts without the permission 
of the territorial sovereign as a violation of international law; Genet regarded that a mere quibble based on 
"aphorisms of Vat tel." After protest, Genet was recalled by the French authorites. This affair is concisely 
summarized in 4 Moore, Digest of International Law (1906) 485-487. 
131. The tale of American continental expansion at the expense of the Indian population and political 
organization of the continent is far beyond the scope of this study. American reluctance to assume the 
obligations of sovereignty outside the continent was not overcome until the very end of the 19th century. It 
took over forty years of policy argument and political manipulation for those interested in establishing 
American rule in Hawaii to convince an administration and two thirds of the Senate necessary for advice 
and consent to the ratification of an annexation treaty, to achieve it. 1 Moore, Digest 481-504. 
132. 1 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (1826) Lecture IX at p. 169-179 focuses on "Offences against 
the Law of Nations. " 
133. !d. 170. He considered the slave trade to be "condemned by the general principles of justice and 
humanity," but not "piratical" or "absolutely unlawful by the law of nations. " !d. 
134. !d. 171. 
135. !d. 174. 
136. !d. 175. 
137. The most nearly comprehensive study of this use of the term "piracy" in Anglo-American practice 
remains Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947, reprinted 1948) ch. XVIII. As was noted above at 
note 31 with regard to Dickinson's treatment of the American municipal statutes, Lauterpacht's balanced 
work suffers somewhat from a lack of historical perspective and seems to miss the depth of the 
jurisprudential argument. It has been felt necessary to duplicate and supplement his research with regard to 
the early materials and my conclusions are somewhat different. 
138. 16 Geo. III c. ix (1777). This statute was renewed annually until 1782. 18 Geo. III c. i (1779); 19 Geo. 
III c. i (1780); 20 Geo. III c. v(1781); 21 Geo. III c. ii (1782). These statutes are published in 31 Pickering 312; 
32 Pickering 1; iII. 175; 33 Pickering 3; and id. 183. 
139. 1 Moore, Digest 168-169. By 1779 the British were considered to have demonstrated by their 
applying the law of war to land engagements with the Continental Army that they considered the land 
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forces contacts to be governed by international law, not merely British municipal law as it might apply 
under the Statute of Treasons quoted at note 1-201 above. Cpo the treatment of James II's land forces in 
Ireland in the 1690s, above esp. text at note II-20. 
140. The British Ambassador in the Netherlands requested the Dutch to expel from Texel one "pirate, 
Paul Jones, of Scotland, who is a rebel subject and a criminal of the state" in October 1779. 10 Dictionary of 
American Biography 185. The Dutch did expel him, but did not arrest him for "piracy" or any other crime. 
They seem to have regarded the issue as solely one of maintaining Dutch neutrality in a "war" between 
others, even though the British regarded the situation as one of internal criminality among British subjects. 
The British view that "rebels" might be regarded as "pirates" seems consistent with the British legislation 
cited in note 138 above. The apparent rejection of this position by all the other European powers who were 
addressed on the issue is ambiguous. It might merely have been a denial by each power individually that the 
facts warranted the legal conclusion asserted by the British; it does not necessarily deny that rebels before 
achieving a degree of organization and success might be properly treated as "pirates" at international law 
as well as at the municipal law of the defending sovereign. 
141. See text at notes 40-52 above. 
142. Some are cited in another context at note 129 above. The treaties were that with Algiers of 5 
September 1795 (8 Stat. 133); Tripoli of 4 November 1796 (8 Stat. 154); and Tunis concluded on an 
unspecified date in late August 1797 and 26 March 1799 (8 Stat. 157). The Treaty with Algiers was 
superseded inJune/July 1815 (8 Stat. 224), and that new treaty superseded in turn on 23-24 December 1816 
(8 Stat. 244). The Treaty with Tunis was amended in a Convention dated 24 February 1824 (8 Stat. 298). 
Treaty relations with Morocco were begun inJanuary 1787 under the Articles of Confederation (1 Malloy 
1206) and that Treaty remained in force for the new United States until superseded on 16 September 1836 (8 
Stat. 484). 
143. The confusion in thought represented by the glib use of the word "pirate" in connection with the 
Barbary states began in the last decade of the eighteenth century and lasts until today. For an interesting 
example of the rhetoric as it reached scholarly circles, see Paullin, CommodoreJohn RodgJs, 1773·1838 (1910, 
republished by the United States Naval Institute 1967) 93-169. Commodore Rodgers was actively involved 
in the "war" against the "pirates" of Tripoli that began in 1802 and ended in 1805. A parallel not involving 
the word "pirate" might be drawn to treaty relations and "wars" with the American Indian tribes at this 
time. All the early treaties between the United States and the Indian tribes of North America are collected 
in volume 7 of the American Statutes at Large. The legal relationships reflected in the treaty form were 
analyzed by Chief Justice Marshall in The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 
(1831), concluding that "an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state, in the sense 
of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United States" (p. 183). A more 
elaborate opinion resulting from an appeal by a citizen of Vermont from a conviction by a Georgia court 
applying its law to events within Cherokee territory, is \Vorcester v. The State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
515 (1832). In that case Marshall foundjurisdiction in the Supreme Court andoverturned the conviction on 
the ground that under the Constitution, treaties and federal statutes, the law of Georgia did not apply in the 
territory set aside for the Cherokee nation by the law of the United States. In a later case, the Supreme 
Court held that Federal legislation could supersede treaty stipulations with the Indian tribes, and there was 
no violation of either American municipal law or international law in that event. The Cherokee Tobacco, 
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871). The Supreme Court in that case held that the Indians' sole redress was to 
appeal the questions of policy to the Congress (p. 621). It can be seen that while the legal label "pirate" was 
not used, the result implied by the use of the term-the submerging of the organized society to which it was 
attached to the legal system ofits dominant neighbor-was achieved by interpretation of the Constitution 
and the subordination of the branch oflaw governing "treaties" with the victim society to the overarching 
law of the conqueror. In this way, the law of war could be argued to be not applicable to military relations 
with the victim society, but only a special category of the municipal law of the expanding state seeking to 
submerge its neighbor. Further analysis of this legal technique of engulfment as it applied to Indian tribes in 
North America is beyond the scope of this work. 
144. Cited at note 35 above. 
145. See note 44 above. This provision, with minor changes, is still law in the United States. 18 U.S. 
Code sec. 1652. It is reproduced in Appendix II.C below. 
146. Stat. 175, Act of3 March 1847, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 51. This statute is still law in the United 
States. 18 U.S. Code sec. 1653. It is reproduced in Appendix II.C below. 
147.2 Moore, Digest 974, citing a letter dated 23 October 1794 by Edmund Randolph as Secretary of 
State. 
148. IJ., citing a report dated 25 January 1806 by James Madison as Secretary of State. 
149. The Act of5 June 1794, 3rd Cong., 1st. Sess., ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, was extended for two years by the 
Act of2 March 1797, 5th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 1, 1 Stat. 523, and further extended indefinitely by the Act of 
24 April 1800, 6th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 35, 2 Stat. 54. All three statutes were repealed by the Act of20 April 
1818, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447. Also replaced by the Act of1818 was another Neutrality Act, 
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An Act to Prevent Privateering Against Nations in Amity with, or Against Citizens of, the United States, 
dated 14June 1797, 5th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 5, 1 Stat. 523. The Act of1818 also repealed the Neutrality Act 
of3 March 1817, 14th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 58, 3 Stat. 370. See note 175 below. 
The Act of1818 replaced these earlier statutes with a comprehensive Neutrality Act, preserving many of 
the terms of the previous legislation. The current annotated edition of the U.S. Code traces the provisions 
of18 U.S. Code sees. 961 and 962 back to the Act of 1794. The language of sees. 958 and 959 also seems to 
have had its origin then. It would be tedious in this place to attempt to trace back to original sources all the 
terms in titles 18 and 22 of the U.S. Code that trace back to the Neutrality Acts of 1797-1818 and later. 
150. John Paul Jones himself sailed under Russian commission against Turkey and Sweden as a regular 
officer of the Russian Navy in 1788 while maintaining in full his American citizenship. 10 Dictionary of 
American Biography 187. The Confederated American States were neutral in that conflict. 
151. 2 Moore, Digest 976-977, memorandum of16 March 1854 recording a conversation between the 
American Minister (Ambassador) at London,James Buchanan, and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Clarendon. 
152. IJ. Buchanan does not appear to have cited the cases he had in mind. 
153. See text at notes 81-83 above. That was the case in which section 8 of the Act of1790 was construed 
to apply to foreigners acknowledging no state authority and attacking all victims indiscriminately, even if 
none of the immediate victims was American. Its logic rested on the Zouche-Blackstone-Story conception 
of the "law of nations. " 
154. Of course, in a sense the issues arose much earlier, in the licensing of privateers and the 
commissioning of Naval officers like John Paul Jones to raid British shipping during the revolution, when in 
British contemplation the American states and Continental Congress lacked legal authority to issue 
commissions without the express approval of the Crown. But Jones was not caught and there is no record of 
any American privateers actually being tried for "piracy" by an English court. See text at notes 138-140 
above. 
155. U.S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 8, c1. 11. 
156. 5th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 67,1 Stat. 578. This American municipal legislation was not binding in 
France or on the French state as a matter of international law-the law between states. Presumably France 
and the United States Congress speaking for the entire union differed at this point as to the continued force 
of the alliance of 1778 (1 Malloy 479) and the Convention of 14 November 1788 (id. 490), which was 
formally ratified in 1790, after the new Constitution had gone into effect. The United States Supreme 
Court held in 1801 that the Act of7 July 1798 abrogated this latter Convention as far as the United States 
was concerned even if France disagreed. Talbot v. Seeman,S U.S. (2 L. Ed.) 15, 1 Cranch 1 (1801). 
157. Act of9 July 1798, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578. 
158. See the classification system of Henry Marten, at note II-43 above. 
159. 1 AG 49. As I read the penultimate quoted sentence an American acting against the United States 
with or without a French commission would be committing "treason;" a foreigner within the United 
States would be committing treason unless he had a French commission, in which case he would be a lawful 
combatant. 
160. See text at note 52 above. Perhaps Pinckney's Treaty was disregarded because Marshall foresaw the 
problems that became evident in 1821. See text at notes 193-197 below. 
161. U.S. v. Hutchings, 26 Fed. Cas. 440, No. 15,429 (1817) at pp. 441-442. 
162. See text at note 35 above. 
163. U.S. v. Palmer et al. cited note 62 above, at p. 636-637. 
164. IJ. at p. 641-624. See text at note 78 above. 
165. IJ., dissent by Johnson 636 sq. at p. 641. 
166. IJ. 643, quoted in text at note 79 above. 
167. IJ. 635. 
168. !d. 643-644. 
169. Obviously, this resulnvas identical to that reached by Englishjurists by 1729. See text at note II-47 
above. From this point on, it seems clear that the classification of "pirate" for a person depredating at sea 
without the license of a recognized government was regarded as coming from specific treaty law or from 
municipal law applicable to nationals or purported nationals of the depredator's state only. No cases 
indicating a contrary view have been found, and the theoretical writings making broader assertions of the 
requirement of a license contain no argument or precedent beyond those fully considered above. Cf. 
Supreme Court's decision (by Justice Henry Livingston) in theJosepha Seconda discussed in the text at notes 
198-200 below. 
170. Cited at note 149 above. 
171. IJ., p. 384. See note 149 above. 
172. 1 AG 35 at 36. The opinion is dated 20 January 1796. The addressee is not specified; presumably it 
was Secretary of State Pickering. 
173. 1 AG 181 at 182. William Wirt to Elias Glenn, opinion dated 6 November 1818. 
196 The Law of Piracy 
174. Wirt cited Vattel, op. cit. note II-137 above, Book III, ch. ii, sec. 15: "[N]o one may recruit soldiers 
in a foreign country without the permission of the sovereign [personne ne peut en enroller en pays etranger, sans la 
permission au Souverain]." 
175. Cited and placed in context at note 149 above. The quoted langnage is in the Act of3 March lS17 
and is repeated with a minor change in section 3 of the Act of20 AprillS1B that repealed the Act oflB17. 
176. Similar limitations appear in the replacement statute of IBIB. 
177. \Valker Lewis, John Quincy Adams and the Baltimore "Pirates," 67 Am. Bar Assoc. Journal 1011 
(19Bl) at 1013. I am grateful to Professor Edward Gordon of Albany Law School and The Fletcher School of 
Law & Diplomacy for bringing this article to my attention. Apparently, the outcome of the case continued 
to rankle in the mind of John Quincy Adams. As Secretary of State in the Monroe Administration and 
author of the parts of Monroe's State of the Union Address announcing the Monroe Doctrine on 2 
December IB23, he was probably responsible for the reiteration of Executive dominance over what the 
courts might call "piracy" by referring to both commissioned and "unlicensed" piracies being suppressed 
by American Naval action: 
Although our expedition, cooperating with an invigorated administration of the 
government of the island of Cuba, and with the corresponding active exertions of a British 
naval force in the same seas, have almost entirely destroyed the unlicensea piracies [emphasis 
added] from that island, the success of our exertions has not been equally effectual to 
suppress the same crime, under other pretenses and colors, in the neighborhood of Porto 
Rico. They have been committed there under the abusive issue of Spanish commissions. At 
an early period of the present year remonstrances were made to the governor of thu island, 
by an agent who was sent for the purpose, against those outrages on the peaceful commerce 
of the United States, of which many had occurred. 
2J. Richardson, ed., Messages ana Papers of the Presiaents (lB96, 1910) 776 at7B3. It seems notable that both acts 
done unlicensed and acts done under "the abusive issue of' "commissions" are denominated "piracies," 
but that their legal results differ; the former were regarded as subject to immediate political action by the 
Navy, and the latter as subject to diplomatic remonstrance only, in the first instance. Despite the use of the 
word "crime," there is no mention of tribunals or their jurisdictional and substantive problems. This 
approach can be usefully compared with the British approach at the same period, when the word "pirate" 
was changing meaning and becoming a legal justification for political action in disregard of municipal 
criminal law and in increasing disregard of what had been thought to be the international law on the 
subject. See chapter IV below. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Alan Henrikson of the Fletcher 
School of Law & Diplomacy, for bringing this paragraph of President Monroe's "Doctrine" speech to my 
attention. 
178. Text at notes 53 sq. above. 
179. See text at note 35 above. 
IBO. U.S. v. Jones, 3 Washington 209 (lB13). 
IB1. Washington called it the Kyd case and cited 5 State Trials 313. No such case appears in How. St. Tr. 
(which was not in any event published untillB16) at that place, but from the context it seems clear that 
\Vashington was referring to the Kidd case rehearsed at length in chapter II above as it was reported in 
some earlier compilation. 
lS2. U.S. v. Jones at p. 216. Of course, the Kidd case was decided not by Common Law but by an 
Admiralty commission using Common Law procedures under the Act of 1536. See chapter II above. 
IB3. IJ., p. 215, 220. Cpo Story's naturalist expansion of the law he asserted to be the international law of 
"piracy" in U.S. v. Tully and Dalton discussed in the text at notes 54-59 above. The precise language of the 
Act is in the text at note 35 above: " ... murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed within 
the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death." Story had 
expanded another clause of the definition relating to "piratically or feloniously" running away with a ship 
to include such running away even without the physical putting into fear that was necessary to meet the 
English Common Law of "robbery" definition normally used in English Admiralty courts. The Common 
Law definition of "felony " is complex: "Embezzlement" was not a felony, but a taking "animo furanai" by 
anybody not lawfully possessed could be. See 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (16B5 ed.) 61-62. See notes 1-134, 
1-165 and II-49 above. 
184. U.S. v.Jones, p. 223. 
IB5. See text at notes 91-96 above. 
186. See note 149 above. The Act of20 AprillB1S was in force in IB20. 
IB7. Presumably under the act of 1790, section 9. See notes 44, 135 and IB U.S. Code sec. 1652 in 
Appendix II.C. below. U.S. v. Griffen and Brailsford, IB U.S. (5 Wheaton) 184 (lB20) at 204-205. 
18B. U.S. v. Holmes et ai., IB U.S. (5 Wheaton) 412 (lB20). 
IB9. Cited above at note B1. 
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190. u.s. v. Holmes at pp. 419-420. The last phrase, "any government whatsoever, " seems to imply that 
the Buenos Ayres authorities would have been taken to be empowered legally to issue a commission, but 
the court believed that the jury might find that the depredation had occurred regardless of it. The position 
taken was essentially the same as in U.S. v. Klintock a few months earlier. See text at notes 81-83 above. 
191. \Vheaton cited for this only the letter by Jenkins analyzed at notes II-73 sq. above. 
192. \Vheaton, Elements of International Law (Text oft836 with Dana's commentary oft866 and additional 
commentary by George Grafton Wilson) (CECIL 1936) secs. 124-125 at p.162-164. Wheaton's view was by 
1836 somewhat narrower than that expressed in his comment on U.S. v. Wiltberger analyzed in the text at 
note 74 above. 
193. Cited at note 149 above. 
194. See text at note 52 above. 
195. Cited at note 149 above. 
196. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings on that point. 
197. The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 152 (1821) at 171. 
198. The Josefa Segunda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheaton) 338 (1820). 
199. IJ. at p. 358. 
200. IJ. 
201. 20 U.S. (7 Wheaton) 283 (1822). 
202. IJ. 337. 
203. See note 52 and text at notes 194 and 195 above. Not only was Chaytor's nationality unclear, and 
thus his being a "citizen of the United States" within the terms of article 14 doubtful, but Story, apparently 
erroneously, categorized the InJepenJencia as a public warship of Buenos Ayres and not a mere privateer. IJ. 
346. 
204. IJ. 348-349. 
205. IJ. 355. 
206. The Hercules, cited note 117 above, at 1519. 
207. IJ. 1518-1519. 
208. See text at notes 1-170 to 1-172 above. 
209. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheaton) 1 (1826) at p. 41. 
210. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 1 (1827). Story did not speculate as to whether France might 
have had a valid claim against Spain for what he apparently conceived to be a violation of the laws of 
maritime warfare. 
211. Statute of3 March 1819, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 77 sec. 2, 3 Stat. 510 at pp. 512-513, extended by 
the statute of 15 May 1820, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., ch.113sec. 1,3 Stat. 600. Story refers to them as chs. 75 and 
112 respectively but there seems to be no doubt as to the language to which he was referring. 
212. The Palmyra at 16-17. 
213. IJ.16. 
214. U.S. v. Kessler (Circ. Ct., D. Penn.) 26 Fed. Cas. 766, No. 15,528 (1829). 
215. IJ. 772. 
216. IJ. 774. 
217. U.S. v. Brig Malek Adhel, cited at note 106 above, at 1 Deak 58-59. 
218. IJ., 1 Deak 59. 
219. IJ.64-65. 
220. See text in note 44 and in text at note 145 above. Section 9 of the Act applies only to "any citizen" of 
the United States. Since it directs treatment as a "pirate" to any citizen who commits "piracy" or 
"robbery" against any other American citizen on the high seas "under color of any commission from any 
foreign Prince or State," the charge would stick even if there were no legal question of the capacity of the 
revolutionary government of Texas to issue such a commission. Of course, if there were no valid 
commission, section 8 of the Act of1790, or section 5 of the Act oft819, would apply and the Americans 
would have been "pirates" as far as the law of the United States was concerned. Section 8 of the Act oft 790 
is quoted in pertinent part at note 35 above. The Act oft819 is reproduced in full in Appendix II.A below. 
221. 3 AG 120 at pp. 121-122, opinion dated 17 May 1836. 
222. IJ., p. 122. 
223. IJ. 
224. Accessory Transit Co. Claim, 2 Moore, International Arbitrations • •• 1551 (1898) at p. 1561. 
225. It is highly relevant to an understanding of such later cases as the De1agoa Bay Arbitration, in which 
a Swiss arbitral tribunal reluctantly held itself to be bound by the terms of an arbitral compromis to accord to 
British and American investors in a Portuguese Corporation in Mozambique the very protection refused to 
American investors in Nicaragua in this case. See 5 Parry, ed., British Digest of International Law 535 at 560. 
The literature on the Delagoa Bay Arbitration is voluminous and seems to be comprised mostly of 
claimants' arguments that the compromis forced on Portugal represents a better expression of the underlying 
natural law protecting investors than the constitutional phases of the legal order protecting national 
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discretion with regard to national corporations in which foreigners have invested. The degree to which the 
international legal order gives an investor's state standing to protect investments made through companies 
of a nationalizing state, or a third state, is still a matter of considerable dispute. See The Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company Case, (Belgium v. Spain), I.C]. Reports 19701-
226. Accessory Transit Co. Claim, cited note 224 above. Quotations are from p. 1561-1563, italicized 
words sic. 
227. Letter from Fox to Webster, 12 March 1841, 29 BFSP 1126 at 1127. This was the beginning of the 
famous correspondence in which Daniel Webster first formulated the phrase that has been taken to set 
forth the general international law of self-defense. It involved a band of British and Americans in a ship, the 
Caroline, planning a raid across the Niagara River from the New York shore. A British expedition raided 
the Caroline first in "self-defense" and sent her flaming over the falls. See 2 Moore, Digest 409-414. 
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